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ABSTRACT
The commonly understood and traditional forms of termination 
for a public firm are the takeover and bankruptcy. "Going 
private" is a new and interesting third alternative. once 
the "going public" option— a significant number of observed 
reverse leveraged buyout (LBO) cases— is taken into account, 
however, the fundamental difference between this new
alternative and traditional ways becomes apparent. Even 
more fascinating than the "public-to-private private-to- 
public" move is the fact that some companies go private 
again.
This dissertation examines the phenomenon of re-LBOs; 
that is, the practice of going private via management buyout, 
then reobtaining public status through a new initial public 
offering, and then going private a second time. The
dissertation encompasses various dimensions that should, in 
addition to explaining re-LBOs, provide new evidence for 
existing theories of going-private transactions.
First, the dissertation investigates the applicability of 
the leading theoretical and empirical issues of LBOs to a re- 
LBO sample, thus providing a comparative analysis of LBOs and 
re-LBOs. Specifically, it challenges the free cash flow
argument of LBOs by replicating the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 
study of going-private transactions with the re-LBO sample.
Second, the dissertation proposes an information 
asymmetry hypothesis to going-private transactions. This part
x
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of the dissertation reports the results of a survey of the 
views of management in 600 LBOs. The results of the survey 
are substantiated by tests of a set of hypotheses that exploit 
either reverse LBO or re-LBO samples to provide additional 
statistical evidence on the information asymmetry issue. 
Although reverse LBOs have been examined in the finance 
literature to some degree, the use of re-LBO firms to study 
management buyouts is original.
xi
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the phenomenon 
of re-LBOs; that is, the practice of going private via 
management buyout, then reobtaining public status through a 
new initial public offering, and then going private a second 
time. It is posited that the initial buyout occurs because of 
management's belief that the firm is undervalued. This belief 
is tantamount to saying that the firm is worth more than its 
market value. Incumbent management thus implements a buyout, 
believing that it can increase the market value of the firm 
and profit in the process. If this argument holds, then 
management will bring the firm public again in order to 
exploit the benefits of removing the firm from public 
scrutiny. Moreover, as intuition suggests, if the objective is 
successfully achieved, the whole process will be repeated.
"Going private" through management buyout (MBO) and its 
consequences have been the subject of frequent debates among 
policy makers and financial economists during the last 15 
years.1 By no means does this era constitute the entire 
period of these highly levered transactions, however. In 
fact, leveraged buyouts (LBOs), known as "bootstrapping," date 
to the early 1960s. In its earlier versions, an LBO was a 
practice by which the owner/founder, seeking to cash out his 
investment, transferred the firm to managers or younger family 
members, who would put up a small amount of capital and borrow
1
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the rest. Today, LBOs differ from their earlier appearance in 
that they have been applied to those companies that are not 
only large, but also publicly traded.2
The going-private transaction encompasses a number of 
inextricably connected theoretical issues: the capital
structure of a firm (which translates into tax savings, 
signaling, and wealth transfers among parties), agency theory, 
dividend policy, and ownership structure. MBOs thus provide 
a single case that incorporates various unresolved issues in 
corporate finance. This fact makes MBOs even more interesting 
to study than any one component alone.
Research on the subject has generated several hypotheses 
that seek both to justify buyout activities and to explain the 
source of significant premiums paid to shareholders. Although 
they fail to provide a single precise source of gain for the 
value creation of LBOs, findings tend to support the 
elimination of public reporting expenses and agency costs, 
alignment of managerial interests with company objectives, 
monitoring by sponsors/buyout specialists, and tax effects. 
This agreement among studies mitigated the public criticism of 
the LBO phenomenon until the appearance of reverse LBOs (i.e., 
LBO firms that subsequently return to capital markets). The 
enormous returns earned by some buyout investors served to 
heighten the public skepticism associated with buyout 
transactions. If indeed the sources of the gains were those 
mentioned above, why would LBO firms become public companies
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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again? Even more fascinating than the previous question is 
why some of these reverse LBOs would go private a second time 
(i.e., become re-LBOs).
This dissertation seeks to provide an answer to these 
questions. Accomplishing this objective extends the empirical 
work on buyout transactions in two ways.
First, this dissertation uses a re-LBO sample to 
replicate the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) study of free cash flow 
and stockholders' gains in going-private transactions. Lehn 
and Poulsen find a significant relation between undistributed 
cash flow and a firm's decision to go private. Parallel with 
this conclusion, they report that a major source of 
stockholder gains in going-private transactions is the 
mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash flow, 
an hypothesis introduced by Jensen (1986). Lehn and Poulsen's 
study is certainly not the only one analyzing certain 
characteristics of going-private firms; however, it appears to 
be the eminent work on the direct test of the free cash flow 
hypothesis, which has already been scrutinized.3 
Inconsistencies in the Jensen's free cash flow theory and 
conflicting results from its empirical investigation suggest 
that additional research is needed on the subject. This 
dissertation, hence, examines the relevance of the free cash 
flow hypothesis to MBOs by using the re-LBO sample. As such, 
this section of the dissertation can be also viewed as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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search for the explicit similarities or differences between 
LBOs and re-LBOs.
Second, this dissertation explores the role of 
information asymmetry as a rationale for buyouts. In theory, 
especially in the settings of a Modigliani and Miller 
(henceforth, MM) world, an LBO is merely a change in the 
organizational and capital structure of a firm and should 
provide no additional gains to the parties. Observation of a 
significant number of LBOs suggests, however, that corporate 
managers view corporate restructuring activities differently 
than has been suggested by theory and may have other reasons 
for initiating these activities.
Proposing the asymmetric information for LBO transactions 
is not new. In fact, both Smith (1990) and Ofek (1994) cast 
doubt on the information asymmetry hypothesis in that their 
findings associate performance improvements to completed 
buyout proposals only. Although existing evidence cannot 
empirically substantiate the asymmetric information 
hypothesis, conclusions are based on a limited study only and 
lack evidence that can come only from a more meaningful 
sample.
This dissertation takes a different path. It uses a 
survey of the views of management in 600 LBO cases to 
determine the main motivation for the buyout, and draws on a 
sample of firms that experienced an LBO twice (in other words, 
were re-LBOs) to test related hypotheses. This original
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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sample may contribute much to the continuing debate about 
various explanations of going-private transactions. In the 
present setting, the re-LBO sample, together with the use of 
a reverse LBO sample, is expected to provide additional 
insights into the asymmetric information explanation for MBOs 
through tests of several hypotheses.
Chapter 2 contains a more detailed discussion and review 
of the prior work on both LBOs and reverse LBOs. Chapter 3 
replicates Lehn and Poulsen's (1989) study, using a re-LBO 
sample to show the irrelevance of free cash flow hypothesis as 
a general explanation for going-private transactions. Chapter 
4 presents the results of a survey of management's perception 
of buyouts. Chapter 5 studies remaining hypotheses that are 
intended to provide additional insights into the asymmetric 
information explanation of MBOs by using market data. 
Summary, conclusions, and avenues for future research are 
discussed in chapter 6.
1.1 Notes to Chapter 1
1. In the following, the terms management buyout (MBO) and 
leveraged buyout (LBO) are used interchangeably to define 
a buyout transaction implemented by the management team 
of the company.
2. The RJR-Nabisco buyout, with a bid of $24.9 billion, is 
known as the biggest going-private deal.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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3. The free cash flow hypothesis in general (see Reiter, 
1994) and its application to rationalize LBO transactions 
in particular (see Frankfurter and McGoun, 1996) have 
been questioned in the recent literature.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This review of literature relating to MBOs is divided into 
three parts. The first two parts include a brief discussion 
of the characteristics of going-private transactions (2.1) and 
presents various explanations and evidence associated with 
these transactions (2.2). The third part (2.3) gives an 
overview of previous studies on reverse LBOs (return to public 
ownership).
2.1 Characteristics of Going-Private Transactions
Despite the lack of an applicable theory to explain the 
phenomenon of MBOs, there exists a number of hypotheses 
justifying buyout activities on the basis of economic 
rationales. These hypotheses are neither conclusive nor 
mutually exclusive. Before discussing each hypothesis and its 
relevant empirical findings in detail, it is helpful to review 
the main characteristics of MBO transactions.
Going-private deals differ from other corporate control 
transactions primarily in that they do not combine two 
previously separate entities into a single public economic 
unit, but, instead, create a privately held company with a 
limited number of investors. Since incumbent management often 
appears as the bidder and since such transactions are usually 
financed largely with debt, these activities are called MBOs, 
LBOs, or (more descriptive, but used less frequently) 
leveraged management buyouts (LMBOs). There is a tendency for
7
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management's equity ownership to increase as a result of the 
MBO. To secure the loans, management pledges the assets and 
future cash flows of the subject company as collateral.
Another characteristic of MBOs is the participation of 
large-block equity investors, who in most cases are buyout 
specialists. These large-block investors are usually 
appointed to the board of directors and maintain an active 
role in monitoring management's activity and performance. A 
third characteristic of these transactions is the absence of 
registration and other public ownership expenses, owing to the 
new organizational form. A fourth characteristic of MBOs is 
the considerable reduction in the liquidity of a firm's claims 
(especially equity claims) because of lost or limited access 
to public equity markets after the buyout.
Studies by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), Marais, 
Schipper, and Smith (1989), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), and 
Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) report a 30% to 40% premium paid to the 
shareholders over the pre-buyout market price. In view of 
such gains, it is not surprising that MBOs raise several 
issues that are worth studying, particularly with regard to 
the effect of MBOs on the efficiency and market value of 
firms. In fact, the issue of excess gains accruing to pre­
buyout stockholders has, in itself, been the subject of 
several studies. For example, Torabzadeh and Bertin (1987) do 
not test any specific hypothesis, but show significant 
positive abnormal returns of 23.26% realized by target
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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shareholders as a result of the buyout announcement. 
Torabzadeh and Bertin view this result as justification of the 
economic rationality of MBOs, when in fact it could simply be 
a means of wealth transfer.
2.2 Explanations for Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)
This section presents seven possible explanations or 
hypotheses for LBOs. These include cost savings, tax savings, 
wealth transfer, management incentives, free cash flow, 
undervaluation of stock, and management manipulation.
2.2.1 Cost Savings on Shareholder Relations 
An immediate gain that going-private can generate is the 
saving of registration, listing, and other public ownership 
expenses, such as disclosure requirements, which can be 
especially significant for smaller firms. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Rice (1984) are first in proposing and examining this 
potential source of value. In their hypothetical setting, an 
annual potential saving of $100,000 from such items translates 
into a present value of $1,000,000 at a 10% discount rate. 
The importance of this example is strengthened by the findings 
of Maupin (1987), who estimates the direct costs (excluding 
management time and indirect costs such as additional audit 
fees) of public ownership to range between $60,000 and 
$250,000 per year. By itself, however, this explanation is 
sufficient only for the smallest scale MBOs.
At least two drawbacks of this explanation are in order: 
(1) cost savings on shareholder relations cannot rationalize
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the reverse LBO phenomena observed by Cummings (1989), 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989, 1990), and Ainina and Mohan 
(1991); and, (2) this rationale ignores the fact that LBOs 
with outstanding debt continue to incur some public relations 
costs since they must still file 10Q and 10K reports with the 
SEC. In fact, even in the absence of public debt, buyout 
firms may seek some costly means to disseminate the 
information about their financial performance to the market. 
They do this because greater uncertainty about the firm 
results in a lower price when they go public again. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) argue, for example, that the 
public knows more about firms re-entering the capital markets 
(reverse LBOs) than firms entering the market for the first 
time. In support of their argument, they report statistically 
significant less underpricing for the reverse LBO firms at 
their "second" initial public offering than for those firms 
that go public for the first time. It seems necessary, 
therefore, to keep the market informed so that the LBO can 
command a higher price when it goes public again.
2.2.2 Tax Savings
The most frequently cited benefit of going-private is the tax 
saving. In fact, both Lowenstein (1985) and Frankfurter and 
Gunay (1993) argue that the use of debt in buyout deals is 
attributable to tax subsidy only. In addition to the tax 
shield of higher interest costs, buyout reduces the tax
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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liability through the increased depreciation deduction 
associated with the write-up of assets following the buyout.
The evidence presented by Lehn and Poulsen (1988), 
Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989), Kaplan (1989a), and 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) supports the tax advantages 
of LBOs. For example, using a sample of 76 management-led 
going-private transactions undertaken in the period 1980 to 
1986, Kaplan (1989a) estimates a median value of tax-driven 
benefits (both from interest and depreciation deductions) that 
is between 21% and 142.6% of the premium paid to shareholders. 
Similarly, Schipper and Smith (1988) find a strong correlation 
between tax benefits and the premium paid. Kaplan (1989a) 
also reports that the excess return to pre-buyout shareholders 
is significantly related to potential tax benefits generated 
by the buyout. He does not find any significant relation 
between the excess return to post-buyout shareholders and 
potential tax benefits of the buyout, however.
All the above studies agree, nevertheless, that the total 
value created in an LBO cannot be explained by tax advantages 
only. This point is confirmed by one of the advocates of debt 
(due to the interest tax shield it creates) in a firm's 
capital structure. Miller (1991) states, " . . .  tax savings 
alone cannot plausibly account for the observed LBO premiums." 
In this vein, Frankfurter and Gunay (1993) take the previous 
literature one step further and, in a partial-equilibrium, 
asymmetric-information setting, show that the major forces
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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behind the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders are the 
anticipated tax subsidy and management's desire to divest.
2.2.3 Wealth Transfer from Bondholders
Leverage is not without its cost. Large increments of 
additional debt can increase the potential for bankruptcy and 
hence raise the cost of debt financing. Moreover, in an 
option-pricing framework, any risk-increasing activity of the 
firm will enhance the position of the stockholders at the 
expense of bondholders. Lehn and Poulsen (1988), Marais, 
Schipper, and Smith (1989), Asquith and Wizman (1990), and 
Cook, Easterwood, and Martin (1992) consider the wealth 
transfers from the bondholders of the target firm to 
stockholders (due to the substantial increase in debt-equity 
ratio) as a possible portion of premiums paid to 
shareholders.1
Lehn and Poulsen (1988) report an average price decline 
of 1.42% based on 13 bonds (of various LBO firms) traded on 
the exchange during the 20-day period centered on the LBO 
announcement date. This decline is considerably smaller than 
the 7.21% average drop in the 20-bond index (reported daily in 
The Wall Street Journal) for the same period. Marais, 
Schipper, and Smith (1989) also find minimal effects of going- 
private transactions on debt claims. In fact, the negative 
average abnormal return for a period from the buyout announce­
ment to the completion of transaction is both statistically 
insignificant and limited to nonconvertible bondholders.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Asquith and Wizman (1990) report a loss of 6.8% of the 
gain accruing to the equity holders experienced by bondholders 
with no protective covenants accounts only. Consistent with 
this result, Cook, Easterwood, and Martin (1992) find 
(depending on restrictive covenants) the presence of 
significant bondholder losses that, on average, are 3% of the 
market value of bonds. Overall, the evidence provided by 
these studies is inconclusive, and the magnitude of the 
bondholders' losses is insufficient to explain shareholders' 
gains. This result, not surprisingly, necessitates (and 
generates) the consideration of other factors as the sources 
of gains.
2.2.4 Management Incentives and Performance Improvements
Change in ownership structure brought about by an MBO provides 
a good fit to the agency theory. Specifically, within the 
agency theory, management no longer shares the costs of its 
shirking and its consuming perquisites that may provide 
incentives to improve the firm's operating and management 
performance. With a substantially increased stake by 
management, managerial and stockholder interests are 
presumably aligned more closely.2 Moreover, a closer
monitoring of managers' actions is conducted by other major 
investors, compared with that of a diffused ownership 
structure. These explanations are in keeping with the view 
prevalent in recent literature that there is a tendency to get 
away from finance and provide more micro-economic-oriented
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explanations for going-private transactions.3 Researchers 
following this line of logic also have a positive view of LBOs 
and document substantial efficiency gains stemming from 
organizational changes and asset control.
Kaplan (1989b), Smith (1990), Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Opler (1992), and Ofek 
(1994) provide comparable results characterized, after LBOs, 
by increases in industry-adjusted operating profit/sales, 
operating profits per employee, and operating cash 
flow/operating assets. Kaplan (1989b) analyzes the post­
buyout operating performance of 48 MBOs completed between 1980 
and 1986. His results indicate that 76% of the sample firms 
experienced an average increase in operating income of 40% 
within two years of going private. Over a three-year post­
buyout period, average operating income was 42% higher than 
that for the year preceding the buyout. Moreover, operating 
income measured net of industry changes remained essentially 
unchanged in the first two post-buyout years and became 24% 
higher in the third year. Kaplan's conclusion that efficiency 
gains constitute a major source of pre-buyout shareholders' 
gains is driven by the high correlation found between the 
premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders and post-buyout 
performance improvements.
Smith's (1990) examination of 58 MBOs, completed during 
the period 1977 to 1986, provides results consistent with 
Kaplan's (1989b); that is, operating cash flow per employee
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and the operating cash flow per dollar book value of assets 
increase relative to the year preceding the buyout. Like 
Kaplan, Smith finds that cash flow improves under private 
ownership. Smith attributes this finding to better management 
of working capital, which is reflected as a reduction in the 
inventory-holding period and in the accounts-receivable- 
collection period.
Unlike Kaplan (1989b) and Smith (1990), who analyze 
company-level data, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) examine 
total factor productivity (output per unit of total input) of 
approximately 1,000 plants involved in LBOs during the period 
1981 to 1986. They find an improvement in plant productivity, 
which moves from 2.0% above the industry mean in the three 
pre-buyout years to 8.3% above the mean in the three post­
buyout years.
At the case study level, Baker and Wruck (1989) credit 
organizational changes, characterized by heavy debt load and 
management equity ownership, for the improved operating 
performance of the company, O.M. Scott & Sons. They view a 
stronger incentive compensation plan, a reorganization and 
decentralization of decision making, and monitoring by 
sponsors as equally important. The role of these factors 
becomes more apparent in Denis' (1994) comparison of Kroger's 
recapitalization and Safeway's LBO. Although both 
transactions resulted in debt levels of more than 90%, 
Kroger's managers were not as successful as Safeway's in
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improving profits and cash flows. Denis attributes this 
result to Kroger's lack of increased managerial shareholding, 
sponsor's ownership and monitoring, and the close linking of 
managerial compensation to company performance.
2.2.5 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
Jensen (1986, 1988) extends the agency-theory-based management 
incentive and compensation hypothesis of LBOs by assigning 
debt a special role in these transactions. His argument 
differs from the conventional view of debt as a tax advantage. 
According to Jensen, many of the benefits in going-private 
transactions stem from debt's "control function" on managers 
with respect to free cash flow. Free cash flow is defined as 
cash flow in excess of that required to fund all positive net 
present value (NPV) projects of a firm.
The payout of free cash flow to shareholders is 
consistent with the value maximization principle. Strangely, 
however, debt is thought to be the sole candidate to fit the 
role in distributing the free cash flow through periodic 
interest payments. A permanent increase in dividends does not 
achieve a similar result because such a promise is considered 
weak since dividends can be cut in the future (i.e., there is 
no contractual obligation to make promised dividend payments). 
Management, therefore, selects the debt option instead so that 
if they default they can lose everything, both their ownership 
in the firm as well as their jobs. This story cannot be 
accepted without admitting that managers are acting in the
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best interest of the shareholders, contradicting the "me-first 
rule" of agency theory.
There are, however, several other behaviors consistent 
with "me-first rule" management. One of these is retaining 
the free cash flow to fund new (but not positive NPV) projects 
without a need for external financing. This action protects 
managers from the scrutiny of the capital markets. There is 
also evidence that increases in executive pay are strongly 
related to increases in sales growth (Murphy, 1985), 
suggesting that management wants to have control of the free 
cash flow to increase corporate size even at the expense of 
suboptimal acquisitions.4
Logical inconsistencies in the theoretical arguments 
surrounding free cash flow hypothesis are mirrored in 
empirical studies that produce conflicting results. The 
following discussion covers only those studies of going- 
private transactions that provide evidence about pre-buyout 
characteristics of LBOs.
An implication of the free cash flow argument for going- 
private transactions is that, in order to be an LBO candidate, 
a firm must have substantial free cash flow at the discretion 
of management. Accordingly, firms or divisions of large firms 
that have stable business histories and low growth prospects 
are more likely to be subject to LBOs. Empirical studies make 
observations consistent with these predictions. Most LBOs 
take place in mature industries (Lehn and Poulsen, 1988; and
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Kieschnik, 1989), and the growth rates and capital 
expenditures of LBO firms are lower than those of comparable 
firms in the same industry (Kaplan, 1989a; and Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1988, 1989).
The study by Maupin, Bidwell, and Ortegren (1984) is 
probably the first to explicitly analyze the pre-buyout 
characteristics of LBOs. They use discriminant analysis to 
compare 63 LBO firms during the period 1972 to 1983 with a 
control sample matched by size and industry classification. 
Although their study is descriptive and is not intended to 
test any hypotheses about the motivation of LBOs, it produces 
findings contradictory to the free cash flow hypothesis. They 
report a significantly higher dividend yield variable for the 
LBO firms. This finding, even in the presence of higher cash 
flow variables for the buyout firms, is inconsistent with the 
free cash flow hypothesis since ". . . it [i.e., positive and 
significant dividend yield variable] indicates that whatever 
free cash flows are generated by the firm are distributed to 
stockholders” (Kieschnik, 1989).
Lehn and Poulsen (1988) show that, consistent with 
Jensen's theory, their proxy for free cash flow and the 
premium paid in LBOs are positively related. Consistent with 
their previous finding, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) use a logistic 
regression equation and obtain a significantly positive 
relationship between undistributed cash flow and a firm's 
decision to go private.
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Kieschnik's results (1989), on the other hand, are 
unsupportive of the free cash flow argument, although he uses 
the same method of analysis. He finds that the free cash flow 
variable is statistically insignificant and that it has a 
negative sign. In a more recent study, Opler and Titman
(1993) conclude that the main characteristics of firms 
initiating LBOs are unfavorable investment opportunities (low 
Tobin's q) and high cash flows. Inconsistencies in Jensen's 
free cash flow theory and conflicting results from its 
empirical investigation suggest that additional research is 
needed on the subject.
2.2.6 Undervaluation of the Firm's Stock
There is an apparent conflict of interest in a management 
buyout, since the managers making the purchase have an 
information advantage over both current stockholders and other 
potential purchasers. It is plausible, therefore, to posit 
information asymmetry as an explanation for going-private 
transactions. The rationale behind this assertion is that 
going-private transactions are, in a sense, an extreme form of 
corporate stock repurchase by a management team that possesses 
private and valuable information about the future prospects of 
the firm's cash flows. This contention is in line with Myers 
and Majluf's (1984) suggestion that common stock issuance 
(purchase) will be chosen by management if it believes the 
stock price is too high (low).5
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Both Smith (1990) and Ofek (1994) cast doubt on the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. Their findings attribute 
performance improvements to completed buyout proposals only. 
Specifically, Smith (1990) reports no increase in cash flows 
following a failed buyout proposal, and she reports a similar 
performance for completed management-proposed buyouts and for 
buyouts initiated by a takeover threat or by outsiders. Ofek
(1994) reinforces Smith's findings and reports that, at 
cancellation announcements (of MBO proposals), returns drop to 
2% (from 27% measured for the period extending from one month 
before the buyout announcement to the day after the MBO offer 
announcement), which is insignificantly different from zero, 
and persist there for the following two years. Ofek 
attributes poor performance of uncompleted MBO offers to the 
absence of organizational changes in the completed buyouts 
rather than to information asymmetry. That is, if a buyout is 
motivated by undervaluation, then abnormal returns should 
remain positive regardless of the outcome of the buyout offer. 
The very fact that Ofek's study finds no evidence of 
improvements in operating performance in unwillingly canceled 
offers rules out the possibility that the cancellation results 
from bad information, and, hence, strengthens the doubts about 
the information advantage hypothesis.
2.2.7 Management Manipulation Hypothesis
It is also often indicated in the literature that managers may 
even distort the operating data through manipulations of
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accounting information to reduce the acquisition price.6 
Evidence supporting the manipulation hypothesis is limited. 
Kaplan (1989b), although indirectly, casts doubts on 
management's manipulation. He reports that post-buyout 
operating performance in the first two years after the buyout 
is below the projections provided to prospective lenders by 
managers in the buyout proxy statements. This finding is 
contrary to the view that buyout company managers purposely 
mislead public shareholders by understating the projections.
DeAngelo (1986) explicitly considers the management 
manipulation issue and also fails to support it. She studies 
the accounting decisions made by managers of 64 firms that 
proposed to go private during the period 1973 to 1982. Her 
findings give no indication that managers of sample firms 
systematically understate earnings in periods before an MBO 
proposal. As a possible explanation, DeAngelo suggests that 
outside scrutiny by public shareholders and their financial 
advisers deters management manipulation.
Wu (1992), on the other hand, argues that DeAngelo's 
results may also be due to the fact that she ignores the 
macroeconomic factors, or that management manipulates other 
information in addition to earnings that depress stock prices 
prior to the MBO announcement. For a sample of 107 MBO firms, 
he finds that managers manipulated earnings to depress stock 
prices before the announcement. This practice enabled them to 
pay a lower premium to pre-buyout shareholders. He also
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documents that smaller institutional shareholdings are 
associated with greater earnings decreases, and hence with 
smaller premiums. U.S. companies are not the only ones 
subject to the management manipulation hypothesis. Wright and 
Coyne (1985) use data from the United Kingdom and find support 
for the management manipulation hypothesis.
2.3 Reverse Leveraged Buyouts
Although a precise source of gain has not been found for the 
value creation of LBOs, findings tend to support the 
elimination of public reporting expenses and agency costs, 
alignment of managerial interests with company objectives, and 
tax gains. This agreement among studies mitigated the public 
criticism of the LBO phenomenon until the appearance of the 
reverse LBOs. The enormously large returns earned by some 
buyout investors served to heighten public skepticism 
associated with buyout transactions.7 If indeed the sources 
of the gains were those mentioned above, why would LBO firms 
become public companies again?
2.3.1 Characteristics and Performance of Reverse LBOs
Reverse LBOs have received some measure of attention in the 
recent literature. For example, Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989) use a sample of 74 such firms to examine the 
underpricing phenomenon of initial public offerings (IPOs). 
Their study supports the information asymmetry explanation of 
underpricing in IPOs because average initial returns for firms 
re-entering the public markets (which presumably are better
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known by the public) are lower than those of IPOs. * The 
importance of their study for this research, however, is that 
they report an average life of only 34.2 months (median = 29 
months) for private ownership. As Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989) state,
The relatively short period during which several of the sample firms remained in private hands is noteworthy, given the substantial transactions costs associated with such a public- private-public ownership structure. One firm returned to public capital markets only four months after its LBO, and nine firms reconverted to public ownership less than one year after completing their going private transaction.
In a follow-up study on the same sample, Muscarella and
vetsuypens (1990) examine the performance of these companies
during the period the firm was privately held. For the full
sample, they report a 268.4% median annualized rate of return
on equity, based on comparisons of the going-private price and
going-public price. Overall, their study tends to credit the
incentive effects of high leverage and concentrated ownership,
but fails to provide any evidence that can refute the claim
that buyout investors exploit inside information. In their
words, "It is also possible that the efficiency gains we
document would have occurred anyway, and that managers timed
the buyout to exploit favorable inside information" (ibid., p.
1404).
A notable finding of Muscarella and Vetsuypen's (1990) 
study is that leverage declines under private ownership. For 
their sample of reverse LBOs, the median leverage value 
decreased from 93.4% prevalent after the buyout to 78.6% prior 
to the IPO. Coupled with the fact that only a few companies
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in the sample intend to use the IPO proceeds for capital 
expenditures, their finding suggests that going public lowers 
a company's leverage rather than expands its asset base. 
Indeed, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) report a median post- 
IPO leverage of 55.5%.9
Mohan (1990) also provides a similar conclusion with 
respect to reduction in leverage while the firm was private. 
She interprets the significantly higher capital expenditures 
of the second initial public offering (SIPO) firms in the 
first fiscal year as correcting for the postponement of 
capital expenditures (perhaps due to debt service 
requirements) during the private period.
With respect to the changes in insider ownership 
following a firm's going public again, Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) report that the median ownership of 
executive officers and directors in reverse LBOs drops from 
63.4% prior to the IPO to 44.5% after the IPO. Similarly, 
DeAngelo and Zeckhauser (1993) find that, on average, insiders 
sell 10% of their holdings in the IPO associated with the 
reverse LBO. Note that, although findings on both leverage 
and management ownership in the going-private/going-public 
cycle are consistent with a possible information advantage of 
insiders, they are in stark contrast with agency costs and 
free cash flow explanations of the LBO transactions. That is, 
as pointed out by Van de Gucht (1994), Jensen's (1986, 1988) 
argument would be supported only under the conditions that
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"reverse LBOs continue to exhibit the typical post-buyout 
characteristics, such as high debt and insider ownership 
levels."
Using 85 firms in their sample, Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) 
report 31% cumulative abnormal returns in 25 months after LBO 
firms went public. Further examination of the sample reveals 
that the long-term positive abnormal performance following the 
reverse LBOs is mainly due to takeover premiums. They 
conclude that going public provides initial liquidity and a 
showcase (to buyout specialists) that facilitates a subsequent 
sale to an outside party.
2.3.2 Decision to Return to Public Markets
The study by DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) differs from the 
previous ones by explicitly focusing on the decision to return 
to public ownership (re-entry decision). In an asymmetric 
information framework, they provide a model that predicts 
superior performance before the IPO.
Information asymmetry, in their setting, translates into 
management's manipulation of performance, their extraordinary 
effort before the IPO, or performance borrowing from the 
future (i.e., discounting prices to boost the sales or 
deferring R&D expenses) . Superior performance before the IPO 
is also consistent with pure selection, which refers to the 
tendency of firms to go to market when their performance is 
extraordinarily good relative to other firms and to previous 
years. Although both of these hypotheses predict distinct
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performance in the period before the offer, they differ in 
their predictions of performance in the following periods. 
The pure selection hypothesis suggests an average performance 
in the next period, but the information asymmetry hypothesis 
predicts a sharp deterioration in performance, compared with 
that of other firms.
By using a sample of 62 reverse LBOs, the study finds 
that reverse LBOs display superior performance in the pre­
offering year (compared with other firms and continuing LBOs) 
and a disappointing performance in the following year 
(compared with their own previous year and with the
performance of control firms). This result is consistent with 
the authors' information asymmetry hypothesis.
2.4 Conclusion
To date, the findings cluster around the following factors 
proposed to explain the premiums paid to pre-buyout 
shareholders in going-private transactions: cost savings on 
shareholder relations, tax benefit of debt financing, 
alignment of managerial interests with company objectives, and 
reduction in agency costs. The evidence shows that going 
private leads to operating efficiency gains and increased cash 
flows that are commonly attributed to the reduction of agency 
costs. High insider ownership, monitoring by LBO specialists, 
and the control function of debt on free cash flow are
believed to be combined in a buyout transaction only.
Accordingly, any other form of reorganization (such as a
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leveraged recapitalization) or any other direct form of cash 
distribution (such as increased dividend payments) are not 
viewed capable of producing similar results. What cannot be 
ruled out, however, is that the reported accounting 
performance improvements might also have occurred even without 
these firms going private and may in fact reflect the 
information advantage of management.
Moreover, as the studies on reverse LBOs suggest, the 
improved performance under private ownership appears to be 
temporary. This observation, combined with the fact that 
insider ownership and leverage declines after coming back to 
the public, suggests that managers may be exploiting their 
information privileges.
Finally, one of the popular explanations of LBOs—  
Jensen's free cash flow theory— is found to have logical 
inconsistencies, which are reflected in the conflicting 
results produced by empirical investigation. All these 
observations suggest that additional research is needed on 
going-private transactions.
2.5 Notes to Chapter 2
1. Surrounding the first announcement of RJR Nabisco's LBO, 
RJR Nabisco's common stock price increased 61.8%, while 
the price of one of its outstanding bonds declined 16.5% 
(Wallace, 1988).
2. Kaplan (1989) estimates a median post-buyout equity 
ownership by management as 22.6%. According to 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), it is 63.4%— far higher 
than in public companies.
3. Specifically, Miller (1991) states, "The source of the 
major gains in value achieved in the LBO's of the 1980's
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lies, in fact, not in our newly-recognized field of 
finance at all, but in that older, and long-established 
field of economics, industrial organization. Perhaps 
industrial reorganization might be an apter term."
4. See Mueller (1969) and Roll's (1986) "hubris hypothesis."
5. The use of "debt" can also be justified by referring to
asymmetric information between the management team and 
shareholders in buyout transactions. In the context of 
Leland and Pyle's (1977) model, manager-owners are likely
to have a large equity participation and, naturally,
additional firm-specific risk when information is 
favorable. Combined with the aforementioned statement, 
the signaling model of Ross (1977) and the pecking order 
theory of Myers (1984) will predict debt as the form of 
outside financing. Interestingly, this contention cam be 
extended such that Campbell's (1979) value of information 
confidentiality argument can also be brought into the 
scenario. In Campbell's paper, management— unwilling to 
share valuable information with the new stockholders—  
discloses the information to a bank or uses privately 
placed debt so that only the current shareholders can 
reap the value gain.
6. "The CEO (of Regina) , who held about 50% of the stock 
during the buyout, sold one-tenth of his stake for $2.1 
million. Regina exhibited very strong stock price 
performance in the first two years following its IPO. In 
1988, the CEO abruptly resigned and confessed to having 
manipulated the firm's reported results" (DeGeorge and 
Zeckhauser, 1993).
7. For example, according to Mohan (1990), the management of 
Calton Inc. converted an initial investment of $4,595,000 
into $71,443,000 in a 1.5-year period only. Similarly, 
Ainina and Mohan (1991) report a 521% increase in the 
market value of Leslie Fay between the LBO and SIPO date 
and state that "many critics consider this activity a 
revolving door policy, a process which implies that 
superior information held by insiders who decide when to 
exit and enter the public market."
8. In evaluating a previously bought-out company returning 
to public, investors, in addition to the information 
provided by the prospectus, have access to stock-price 
history at least.
9. The median leverage level prior to the LBO is 43.2% for 
the same sample.
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Chapter 3
AN APPLICATION OF THE FREE CASH FLOW HYPOTHESIS
TO Re-LBOs
3.1 Introduction
This section of the dissertation examines the validity of the 
free cash flow hypothesis to the re-LBO sample. The free cash 
flow hypothesis, first proposed by Jensen (1986, 1988), is 
simply a variation of agency theory. It has found widespread 
application in various areas of finance, including LBOs.
Jensen argues that LBOs help solve the free cash flow 
problem faced by cash-rich firms in industries with low growth 
opportunities. His argument is that higher debt service 
obligations stemming from the buyout transaction preclude 
management's abuse of free cash flow by investing in negative 
net present value (NPV) projects. In other words, management 
is forced to pay out free cash flow in the form of debt- 
service payments on a regular basis. Furthermore, a high- 
equity stake provides incentives to improve cash flow, which 
is necessary to meet debt payments and maximize the company's 
value. It is not clear, however, why management decides to 
give up exploiting the free cash flow and assume the burden of 
excessive debt. This is only one of the questions to which 
Jensen's free cash flow argument cannot provide a clear 
answer.
29
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If debt creation is vital to bond their promise to pay 
out future cash flows, management could pay out the excess 
cash in the form of a dividend increase, a stock repurchase, 
or even a leveraged recapitalization. The free cash flow 
hypothesis in general (see Reiter, 1994) and its applications 
to rationalize LBO transactions in particular (see Frankfurter 
and McGoun, 1996) have been questioned in recent finance 
literature. The return of LBO firms to public ownership puts 
the free cash flow explanation of LBO transactions in serious 
doubt, as does the fact that both management ownership and 
leverage tend to decline following the IPOs (see Muscarella 
and vetsuypens, 1990; and Mohan, 1990). The latter facts are 
in striking contrast to agency costs and free cash flow 
explanations of LBO transactions. Jensen's (1986, 1988)
argument is supported only if reverse LBOs continue to exhibit 
the typical post-buyout characteristics, such as high debt and 
insider ownership levels (Van de Gucht, 1994).
In light of the above discussion, it is believed that the 
applicability of free cash flow explanation to the re-LBO 
sample is a real challenge for Jensen's (1986) infamous 
argument. That is, if indeed Jensen's argument is correct, 
then free cash flow must be the main driving force behind the 
buyout transaction regardless of a firm's past experience with 
LBOs. Therefore, the free cash flow explanation must hold for 
re-LBOs as well.
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3.2 Free Cash Flows and LBOs (Hx)
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the free cash 
flow hypothesis as the motivation for LBOs. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 1: The free cash flow explanation is
irrelevant to the LBO transactions.
To test Ht, free cash flow measures in the re-LBO firms are 
compared with those in a control sample (non-LBO firms). If 
the free cash flow in re-LBO firms is significantly higher 
than that in the control sample, one might conclude that free 
cash flow may indeed be the reason for the re-LBO. Similarly, 
the absence of a significant difference between the two groups 
should lead to the conclusion that free cash flow is not a 
motive for going-private transactions, at least not for re- 
LBOs. A similar study has been done by Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) on LBOs. Since the present study and the Lehn and 
Poulsen study differ only in terms of buyout samples, the same 
method of analysis is used in the current study.
3.2.1 The Lehn and Poulsen Study
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) analyze a sample of 263 successful 
going-private transactions completed between 1980 and 1987 to 
test the free cash flow hypothesis on two grounds:
(1) Do firms that go private have significantly greater 
undistributed free cash flow than similar firms that have 
not gone private?
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(2) Is undistributed free cash flow an important determinant 
of premiums paid in going-private transactions?
For the 244 transactions in the sample for which 
sufficient data were available, they report the following 
average cumulative abnormal returns (all being statistically 
significant at 1% level) associated with their announcements: 
16.3% over the [-1,1] window, 19.9% over the [-10,+10] 
window, and 20.5% over the [-20,+20] window. They also 
measure the average premium paid in these transactions, 
computed as the non-market-adjusted return (including 
dividends paid) from 20 days before the buyout announcement to 
the final price at which the firm's shares traded. The 
average value of the premium is 36.1% (t-statistic » 22.4). 
It is the premium, rather than abnormal returns, that they use 
in searching the determinants of gains accruing to 
shareholders in buyouts.
In examining the free cash flow hypothesis, Lehn and 
Poulsen use two statistical methods of analysis. The first is 
a logistic regression analysis that attempts to determine the 
role of certain variables, particularly those proxying for the 
free cash flow hypothesis, in determining the likelihood of 
going private. The second is an ordinary least-squares 
regression, which intends to explain the cross-sectional 
variations in premiums paid in going-private transactions.
Following Lehn and Poulsen's work, this study examines 
the free cash flow hypothesis on the same two grounds by using
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a sample of 21 re-LBO firms. Lehn and Poulsen find a 
significant relationship between undistributed cash flow and 
a firm's decision to go private. Parallel with this result/ 
they also report a statistically significant positive 
relationship between free cash flow and the premium paid in 
LBOs. This observation leads them to conclude that a major 
source of stockholder gains in going-private transactions is 
the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash 
flow. Whether this conclusion can be generalized to re-LBO 
firms is the concern of the current study.
3.3 Discussion of Method of Analysis and Proxy Variables
3.3.1 Logit Analysis
Logistic regression functions, like the other regression 
functions, are used to describe the nature of the relation 
between the dependent variable and one (or more) independent 
variable(s). They differ from regular regression models, 
however, in that they use a binary dependent variable. The 
value of the dependent variable indicates to which pre­
specified groups a subject belongs.
The predicted values of the dependent variable are 
expected to fall mainly in the interval between 0 and 1. The 
convention then is to interpret the predicted value of the 
dependent variable as the probability of that subject's being 
a member of the pre-specified group, given its characteristics 
(i.e., the values of explanatory variables). In the present 
context, for example, such a prediction would be to see
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whether a firm is an MBO target or not. The main interest of 
this study, however, is to investigate the explanatory power 
of the hypothesized firm characteristics in distinguishing 
between buyout and non-buyout firms, rather than predicting 
the probability of buyout for a hold-out sample.
The logistic regression model is of the following form:
Prob (yx=l) = Fffl'XJ, (1)
where yL is a binary variable with "1" for re-LBO firms and 
"0" for the control sample; F(/3'X) is the logistic function, 
with F(/3'X) = ê 'Vfl+e*'*); /3'X is a linear function of
several characteristics of subjects being studied; /3' is the 
vector of unknown parameters; and X is the matrix of 
independent variables.
In this study, the logit analysis contrasts the firms 
that go private with a control sample of public firms to 
explain the determinants of the likelihood of going private. 
The matching criteria in creating the control sample are as 
follows: (a) four-digit SIC code1, and (b) market value of
equity at the end of the fiscal year preceding the year of the 
going-private transaction.
Free cash flow hypothesis suggests that the proportion of 
a firm's assets consisting of free cash flow should directly 
relate to the likelihood of a firm's going private. 
Accordingly, for each firm in both samples, a measure of 
undistributed cash flow (CF), for the year immediately 
preceding the year of the going-private transaction, is
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calculated. CF, assuming that all positive NPV projects are 
undertaken, should measure post-tax cash flow that was not 
distributed to security holders in the form of interest or 
dividend payments. Therefore, CF is defined as
CF = INC - TAX - INTEXP - PFDDIV - COMDIV, (2)
where:
INC = Operating income before depreciation (Compustat 
item #13)
TAX = Total income taxes (Compustat item #16), minus 
change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the 
current year (change in Compustat item #35)
INTEXP = Gross interest expense on short- and long-term 
debt (Compustat item #15)
PFDDIV = Total amount of preferred dividend requirement 
on cumulative preferred stock and dividends paid on 
noncumulative preferred stock (Compustat item #19) 
COMDIV = Total dollar amount of dividends declared on 
common stock (Compustat item #21)
Average annual percentage increases in net sales 
(Compustat item #12) during the years (4, 3, and 2 years and 
1 year) preceding the going-private transactions proxy for 
growth prospects of each firm. These variables are referred 
to as SALESGRn, where n is the number of years included in the 
calculation of average growth value. The sales growth 
variable is intended to proxy for profitable reinvestment 
opportunities of cash flow. Low growth prospects imply that
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firms have few opportunities to reinvest the cash flow 
profitably in their current lines of business.
Effective tax liability of each company, TAX, is also 
included in the analysis. Both the CF and TAX variables are 
expressed as a percentage of EQUITY, the market value of 
common stock at the end of the year immediately preceding the 
year of the transaction. TAX/EQ is expected to approximate 
the maximum potential tax benefits associated with the going- 
private transaction since tax considerations may also affect 
the likelihood of buyout transactions. TAX/EQ may be highly 
correlated, however, with a firm's undistributed cash flow, 
CF/EQ. The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two 
variables, although not really large, is positive 0.41, but 
not statistically significant at the 5% level.
The final variable included in the logistic regression is 
THREAT, which takes the value of 1 if the firm received a 
competing bid or was the subject of takeover speculation in 
The Wall Street Journal, and 0 otherwise. The role of this 
qualitative variable is to test the importance of takeover 
threats in going-private transactions. The free cash flow 
hypothesis predicts that the threat of hostile takeover is an 
important impetus for going-private transactions.
The variables discussed above form the independent 
variables of the logit models to test whether any or all of 
them will increase the probability of having an LBO. The 
dependent variable of the models takes the value of 0 for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
control firms and 1 for LBO firms. All the explanatory 
variables are expected to have positive coefficient estimates 
except for SALESGR, which should have a negative sign if the 
free cash flow argument is in effect.
3.3.2 Bootstrap Algorithm for Statistical Significance Tests
A major problem exists with respect to the use of logistic 
regression analysis in this study: the sample size. In the 
case of small samples, such as here, the estimates of standard 
errors may not be reliable, thus leading to questionable 
asymptotic t-tests. To remedy this problem, the bootstrap 
method introduced by Efron (1979) is used.3
The bootstrap algorithm randomly (with replacements) 
picks a fixed number of observations from the original sample. 
"By repeating this random sampling procedure, the bootstrap 
can approximate the unknown true distribution of the estimator 
with the empirical 'bootstrap' distribution" (Jeong and 
Maddala, 1993). Bootstrapping is a tool to determine whether 
asymptotic properties seem to hold in the small sample being 
studied. On average, the standard error of an estimator 
estimated by a bootstrap algorithm is greater than the nominal 
standard error (the one given by SAS, for example). In 
essence, what bootstrapping does is to capture finite sample 
variability, which is larger than the asymptotic sample 
variability. Therefore, bootstrap standard errors of the 
estimator are used for the sake of a reliable t-test.
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The following steps are taken in the bootstrap algorithm 
in estimating the standard errors and t-statistics of the 
logistic regression coefficients*
(1) Estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables by
using the original sample in the logistic regression.
(2) Draw 1,000 random samples of the same size from the 
original sample with replacement.
(3) Estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables
for each of the 1,000 samples.
(4) Estimate the standard deviation of each coefficient by
using 1,000 observations of each estimator.
The resulting set of standard errors (steps 2 through 4) 
and the coefficient estimates (step 1) are then used to 
compute "bootstrap" t-statistics.
3.3.3 Ordinary Least-Squares Regression
The objective of this additional analysis is to ascertain 
determinants of premiums paid in going-private transactions. 
If free cash flow is an explanation for buyout transactions, 
it (in addition to explaining variation in the likelihood of 
going private) should explain cross-sectional variation in 
premiums paid in going-private transactions. Specifically, 
premiums paid in these transactions should be directly related 
to the level of the target's free cash flow.
As explained above, the average premium paid in these 
transactions is computed as the non-market-adjusted return 
(including dividends paid) from 20 days before the buyout
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announcement to the final price at which the firm's shares 
traded. Three of the variables— CF/EQ, TAX/EQ, and SALESGR—  
are used as independent variables to explain the variation in 
the premium. As before, the expected signs are positive and 
negative for CF/EQ and SALESGR, respectively, for the free 
cash flow hypothesis to be a valid explanation of going- 
private transactions. Similarly, the sign of TAX/EQ should be 
positive if potential tax savings are a source of premiums 
paid to shareholders.
3.4 Empirical Findings
3.4.1 Re-LBO Sample Characteristics
Twenty one re-LBO cases, discovered from going-private 
transactions that occurred between 1980 and 1995, are used to 
test Ht. A re-LBO firm is defined as one that converts a 
publicly traded corporation (one that experienced a prior LBO 
or divisional LBO with a subsequent return to public markets) 
into a privately held corporation.
In constructing the re-LBO sample, various issues of the 
following publications were first used to identify reverse LBO 
firms: Going Public-The IPO Reporter (a publication of
Investment Dealers Digest); Mergers & Acquisitions; W.T. 
Grimm's Mergerstat Review; and The Yearbook on Corporate 
Mergers, Joint Ventures and Corporate Policy. In addition, 
Investment Dealers Digest (IDD) Information Services provided 
a comprehensive updated list of reverse LBOs that occurred in 
the period 1980 to 1996. Also, Professor Chris J. Muscarella
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supplied a list of reverse LBOs generated by Kidder, Peabody 
& Co. in 1988.
A careful examination of the above sources provided 450 
reverse LBO firms. Next, The Wall Street Journal Index was 
searched for each individual reverse LBO firm (starting at its 
reverse LBO date up to the current date) to see whether the 
firm experienced a second management buyout following its 
return to public markets. This search process yielded 21 re- 
LBO firms for the current study.
Table 3.1 reports various characteristics, grouped by 
year, for the 21 re-LBO firms. Full sample results are 
presented in the last row of the table. The year in which the 
second LBO occurs is given in the first column, which is 
followed by the total number of going-private transactions 
that qualify as re-LBOs for that year. The third column 
presents the average period that firms spend as a free­
standing public firms before their second going-private 
transaction; i.e., time span between their second initial 
public offerings and their second LBOs. The last two columns 
display average value of equity and total value of equity. 
Equity values are computed as the number of common shares 
outstanding times the closing price of common stock at the end 
of the fiscal year immediately preceding the re-LBO year.
Although the study covers a wide period, 1980 to 1995, 
re-LBO firms are clustered in the years 1986 through 1989, 
reaching a peak of nine transactions in 1988. Total equity
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Table 3.1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TBE Re-LBO SAMPLE
Year Number of Re-LBOs




1986 2 17.66 50.122 100.244
1987 3 33.38 162.814 488.442
1988 9 24.69 49.753 447.783
1989 4 41.73 99.260 397.041
1990 1 41.16 99.416 99.416
1991 1 71.26 31.341 31.341
1994 1 16.58 635.000 635.000
Full 31.12 104.738 2,199.498Sample 21 (27.29)c (82.356)d
(a) Average time that the firm spent in the public markets after the 
buyout firm is brought back to the market.
(b) Equity values are computed as the product of the common shares 
outstanding and the closing price of common stock at the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the calendar year of the going- private transaction.
(c) Corresponding median value of public life for the full sample.(d) Corresponding median value of equity for the full sample.
value for the full sample is $2,199,498,000, with a 
corresponding median equity value of $82,356,000.
The majority of the re-LBOs occurred during the period 
when the threat of hostile takeovers was extensive. This 
observation suggests that the 21 re-LBO transactions are the 
result, at least partly, by the hostile takeover threat. On 
the other hand, it may also be due to the fact that 1986 is a 
reasonable year to start seeing re-LBO firms since leveraged 
buyout transactions mainly started in the early '80s, and the 
average time of private ownership for a reverse LBO firm is 34 
months (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990). The average private
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life found in the present sample of 21 re-LBOs, 30.83 months, 
is also consistent with Muscarella and Vetsuypens' reporting. 
Moreover, the average public life of these firms following 
their reappearance in the market is 31.12 months (median = 
27.29 months), also comparable with their private life.
To examine empirically whether hostile takeover threats 
have a role in the occurrence of re-LBOs, The Wall Street 
Journal Index is searched to identify the sample firms that 
either received a competing bid or were subject to takeover 
speculation. The qualitative variable THREAT should capture 
the role of the takeover danger in the following logit 
analysis.
3.4.2 The Announcement Effect of Second LBO Transactions:
An Event Study
A conventional market model event study is used to measure the 
prediction errors in stock returns as follows:
PEi.t= Ri,t - (&i + b ^ ) ,  (3)
where Rift and R*,,. are daily returns for the stock of firm i 
and of the market portfolio at time t, respectively. 
Returns data are obtained from the CRSP (Center for Research 
in Security Prices) tape. Market return is proxied by the 
return on the CRSP value-weighted index. For each firm, 
parameters a* and bx are estimated using OLS regression for 
the period -170 to -21 relative to the announcement day. 
The market model is then used to compute prediction errors 
for the period beginning 20 days before the event day and 
ending 20 days after, as shown in the above equation. The
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relevant null hypotheses are that the average prediction error 
(mean of prediction errors on any day across all 21 firms of 
the sample) and cumulative average prediction errors (summed 
average prediction errors across time for any event subperiod) 
are zero.
To test whether prediction errors are significantly 
different from zero, the following statistical tests are used: 
the standardized residual z-test of Patell (1976), traditional 
t-test proposed by Brown and Warner (1980), and the 
standardized cross-sectional t-test suggested by Boehmer, 
Musumeci, and Poulsen [BMP] (1991).5 The BMP-t test enhances 
the efficiency and the power of the earlier tests as follows: 
it allows for event-induced variance changes and the 
heteroscedastic event-day residuals, and it is adjusted for 
out-of-sample prediction error. The average prediction errors 
associated with the announcement of a going-private proposal 
reported in The Wall Street Journal for the 21 transactions 
are reported in Table 3.2.
On the announcement day, day 0, the average of prediction 
errors is 27.88%— definitely an economically significant 
number. All three statistical tests support the statistical 
significance of the announcement day effect at 1% level. In 
addition, 100% of the events (i.e., 21 re-LBO announcements) 
have positive returns. This evidence supports the view that 
target shareholders realize a value gain in the LBO 
transactions.
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Table 3.2
DAILY AVERAGE PREDICTION ERRORS (APE) FROM 20 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 20 DAYS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 21 Re-LBOs
Day APE PercentagePositive Sign-test*Statistic Traditionalt-statistic Patell-Z BMP-t
-20 -0.002552 47.6 -0.21822 -0.31454 -0.78725 -0.94789-19 0.020178 47.6 -0.21822 2.48662** 0.62490 0.34558
-18 -0.005478 42.8 -0.65465 -0.67517 -0.62286 -0.97986
-17 0.014784 61.9 1.09109 1.82188*** 1.98618** 1.91286***
-16 0.032313 61.9 1.09109 3.98210* 5.57741* 2.04943***
-15 -0.003524 42.8 -0.65465 -0.43436 -0.25949 -0.18902
-14 -0.007618 33.3 -1.52753 -0.93881 -1.03202 -0.82621
-13 -0.003524 42.8 -0.65465 -0.43428 -0.29310 -0.24104
-12 -0.006866 42.8 -0.65465 -0.84623 -0.77878 -0.73514
-11 0.011952 61.9 1.09109 1.47293 2.12496** 2.22730**
-10 0.003678 57.1 0.65465 0.45326 0.70338 1.08312
-9 -0.018775 28.6 -1.96396** -2.31370** -1.50853 -1.09541
-8 -0.012052 57.1 0.65465 -1.48521 -0.80252 -0.58476
-7 0.022095 57.1 0.65465 2.72286** 1.81530*** 1.14691
-6 0.006457 38.1 -1.09109 0.79575 0.08292 0.06427
-5 0.002090 47.6 -0.21822 0.25758 0.48796 0.36127
-4 0.007733 38.1 -1.09109 0.95306 0.91213 0.84525
-3 -0.002380 42.8 -0.65465 -0.29331 -0.29331 -0.04429
-2 -0.001020 33.3 -1.52753 -0.12571 -0.29903 -0.24038
-1 0.003041 38.1 -1.09109 0.37476 0.87108 0.60385
0 0.278840 100.0 4.58258* 34.36340* 44.96070* 5.30307*
+1 0.008972 57.2 0.65465 1.10567 1.21003 1.83301***
+2 -0.001467 61.9 1.09109 -0.18083 -0.36350 -0.53020
+3 0.004602 52.4 0.21822 0.56722 0.66606 0.78365
+4 0.001163 42.8 -0.65465 0.14339 0.21262 0.55302
+5 0.008598 52.4 0.21822 1.05960 0.87494 1.28254
+6 0.028391 71.4 1.96396** 3.49876* 2.18885** 1.07134
+7 -0.004784 33.3 -1.52753 -0.58962 -0.69894 -1.47760
+8 -0.008632 33.3 -1.52753 -1.06383 -1.41372 -2.78438**
+9 0.001410 42.8 -0.65465 0.17379 0.17582 0.35581
+ 10 0.003277 57.1 0.65465 0.40388 0.81825 1.64618
+11 -0.002585 38.1 -1.09109 -0.31866 -0.29596 -0.68261
+12 0.002853 47.6 -0.21822 0.35159 0.30484 0.74948
+13 -0.013584 47.6 -0.21822 -1.70736 -0.77522 -0.51267
+14 0.004238 57.1 0.65465 0.52231 -0.07084 -0.07794
+15 0.003405 47.6 -0.21822 0.41972 0.37759 0.91431
+ 16 0.000306 23.8 -2.40040** 0.03780 -0.06008 -0.12314
+17 -0.000428 52.4 0.21822 -0.05279 0.05589 0.13939
+ 18 -0.002313 52.4 0.21822 -0.28511 0.11265 0.15996
+ 19 0.005311 57.1 0.65465 0.65453 0.66859 1.42204
+20 -0.006324 42.8 -0.65465 -0.77939 -0.48414 -0.81464
(a) Associated z-values testing the null hypothesis that percentage positive is equal to 0.5.
***, **, and * mark 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively, for two tailed tests.
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The announcement; date reaction by the market is well 
above that reported by the earlier studies of LBOs. This 
discrepancy might be due to the fact that a re-LBO transaction 
is quite different from a typical LBO; hence, its initiation 
may contain additional information that is not present in 
usual LBOs. The reader should recognize that this result is 
in line with the prediction of hypothesis 6, which is 
discussed in Chapter 5.
Figure 3.1 shows the cumulative average prediction errors 
(CAPE) for the event window from day -20 to day +20. This 
figure allows for a clear observation of the instantaneous 








-20 - 18 - 16- 14 - 12-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20Day
Figure 3.1
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE PREDICTION ERRORS 
FOR THE [-20, +20] EVENT WINDOW
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CAPE experiences a sudden and significant jump on the event 
date. Moreover, there seems to be no information leakage nor 
any associated gradual stock price build-up during the pre­
announcement period.
Stockholders certainly do realize a significant wealth
increase, as reflected by the 27.88% APE upon the initiation
of the buyout. The average premium paid in these transactions
is a better measure, however, of wealth increase since
premiums are measured directly (i.e., not as an excess over
some predicted value) and over the full period (i.e., not only
at the announcement, but also including afterward) of the
going-private transactions. In fact, the average premium is
48.44%, well above the APE at the announcement date, and
different from 0 at 1% level of statistical significance. In
the following OLS regression analysis, premiums, rather than
APE, are used as the independent variable while searching for
the determinants of the premiums in re-LBO transactions.
3.4.3 Comparison of the Effect of re-LBO Announcements with 
the Effect of LBO Announcements Documented in Previous 
Studies
In general, findings of the present study are consistent with 
those reported in prior studies. Table 3.3 shows the main 
results of selected papers. The results are conclusive: 
announcements of going-private transactions are associated 
with significant positive excess returns. As a result, target 
shareholders receive an economic gain from the implementation
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Table 3.3
SUMMARY OF GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTION STUDIES
Study Period of Study Number of buyouts EventWindow* CAPE1’(%>
This study 1986-1994 21 [-U [0] [-1,0] 








Amihud (1989) 1983-1986 15 [-20,0] 19.60
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 1980-1987 244 [-1,+1] [-10,+10] [-20,+20]
16.3019.9020.50
Lehn and Poulsen (1988) 1980-1984 93 [-1,0] [-10,+10] 13.9320.76
Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) 1974-1985 79 [-1,0] 13.00
Travlos and Millon (1987) 1975-1983 56 [-1,0] [-10,+10] 16.2019.24
Torabzadeh and Bertin (1987) 1982-1985 48 [Month 0] 18.64
Grammatikos and Swary (1986) 1975-1984 131 [-1,0][-10,0] 14.0419.52
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) 1973-1980 72 [-1,0] [-10,+10] 22.2728.05
(a) Day 0 is the event day, first announcement of the buyout offer commonly retrieved from. The Wall Street Journal. The event window is the event day plus and/or minus some number of days where the sign on the day is relative to day 0.(b) Cumulative average prediction errors.
of the leveraged buyouts. Management, therefore, is not the 
sole beneficiary in this potentially value-enhancing activity.
The gain accruing to target shareholders suggests that 
they are not fully exploited by the initiators of these 
transactions. The target shareholders' gain may be capturing
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less than the total value of the firm after the LBO. Note 
that results of our study differ in that they indicate, for 
any event window, a greater market reaction to the going- 
private announcements compared with the earlier studies. In 
the absence of an accompanying statistical test, it is 
difficult to make a statement about this difference. However, 
this observation may be an indication of market participants' 
revised expectations. That is, if market participants think 
that they were fooled (in terms of splitting the gain with 
managers) in the first deal of the re-LBOs, they expect a 
higher premium for the second buyout. The larger cumulative 
average prediction errors of the current study may simply 
reflect, therefore, the market's retaliation in second 
buyouts.
3.4.4 A Preliminary Comparison of Re-LBO and Control Samples
The matching criteria in creating the control sample are as 
follows: (a) four-digit SIC code, and (b) market value of
equity at the end of the fiscal year preceding the year of the 
going-private transaction. Firms that have the same four­
digit SIC code and whose market value of equity most closely 
matches the re-LBO sample firm's equity are selected for the 
control firms. Table 3.4 lists the mean value of the above 
variables for both the going-private and control samples. The 
fourth column reports the mean difference in the value of each 
variable for each matched pair of going-private firm and 
corresponding control firm.
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Table 3.4
MEAN VALUES OF VARIABLES FOR Re-LBO AND CONTROL FIRMS AND 









104.730 89.788 14.938 0.847
CF/EQ 0.192 0.139 0.052 1.377
SALESGR1 0.338 0.149 0.189 0.851
SALESGR2 0.224 0.134 0.090 0.876
SALESGR3 0.285 0.137 0.148 1.288
SALESGR4 0.251 0.871 -0.620 -0.907
TAX/EQ 0.099 0.039 0.060 3.032*
THREAT* 0.286 0.095 1.620***
(a) A z-statistic testing the difference between the proportions of two groups in THREAT is listed instead of a t-statistic. Twonon-parametric tests, Fisher's exact test and chi-square tests,also provided p-values slightly higher than 0.10.* Statistically significant at a 1% level.*** Statistically significant at a 10% level.
The associated t-statistic for difference in means test 
is given in the last column. This comparison should provide 
an initial feel for the free cash flow hypothesis. The mean 
difference in equity value is not significant. This is an 
expected result since the control sample is matched, in 
addition to four-digit SIC code, by equity value. Contrary to 
the prediction of free cash flow hypothesis, however, the most 
important variable of interest of the study, CF/EQ, does not 
convey a significantly larger mean value for the going-private 
sample than for the control sample. Average values of CF/EQ 
are 0.192 and 0.139 for going-private and control samples,
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respectively. The average difference across the matched pairs 
is 0.052, not different from 0 at the conventional levels of 
statistical significance.
The mean values of the sales growth variables range from
0.224 to 0.338 for the re-LBO sample, and from 0.134 to 0.871 
for the control group. With the exception of SALESGR4, the 
going-private sample is characterized by systematically higher 
growth rates than the control group: a finding contrary to 
Jensen's argument. This finding is especially notable since 
the control group is formed from the same industries as the 
going-private sample. These differences in the mean values of 
the growth variables, however, are not statistically 
significant across the two samples.
The finding of no significant differences in 
undistributed cash flow and growth rates across the two 
samples is a serious challenge to Jensen's assertion that free 
undistributed cash flow and relatively low growth rates are 
the main characteristics of LBO targets. TAX/EQ, on the other 
hand, is significantly larger in the going-private sample than 
in the control sample. Average TAX/EQ is 0.099 for going- 
private firms and 0.039 for the control sample. The average 
difference across the matched pairs is 0.060, significantly 
different from 0 at the 1% level. To the extent that TAX/EQ 
measures approximate the maximum potential tax benefits 
associated with going private, this result supports the tax 
savings argument of LBOs documented in the literature.
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The last variable, THREAT, takes the value of 1 for 28.6% 
of the going-private firms and for 9.5% of the control group. 
This difference is hardly significant statistically (i.e., 10% 
level), suggesting that going-private transactions, at least 
re-LBOs, are not induced by the threat of takeovers. This 
casts another shadow of doubt on Jensen's free cash flow 
hypothesis.
3.4.5 Determinants of the Likelihood of Going Private:
Logit Analysis
Table 3.5 reports results from four logit models in which the 
dependent variable is 1 for the firms in re-LBO sample and 0 
for the firms in the control sample. The only difference in 
each equation is the growth variable that is included as an 
independent variable. The remaining independent variables of 
the models are CF/EQ, TAX/EQ, and THREAT. Coefficients for 
all four equations are estimated for the original sample. Two 
different test statistics are reported for each coefficient. 
The first is the asymptotic statistic reported by SAS; the 
second is based on the standard error of each coefficient 
obtained from the bootstrap algorithm. As expected, all 
bootstrap t-statistics (except for the intercept term in model 
3) are lower because of their higher standard errors.
The results reveal a direct relationship between TAX/EQ 
and the likelihood of going private. Moreover, this 
relationship is statistically significant at the 5% level for 
all four equations. This systematic significant association 
between TAX/EQ and the likelihood of going private persists
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Table 3.5
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LIKELIHOOD OF GOING PRIVATE
































ModelChi-Square(p-value) 12.0300(0.0171) 11.4470(0.0220) 11.1380(0.0251) 13.6300(0.0086)
(a) The asymptotic t-statistic reported by SAS.
(b) The t-statistic obtained through the bootstrap algorithm. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level.*** Statistically significant at the 10% level.
even in the case of bootstrap-estimated standard errors, 
although, in the last two models, TAX/EQ is significant at the 
10% level only.
The coefficient of THREAT has the anticipated positive 
sign in all four equations; however, the coefficients are 
statistically significant only at the 10% level. In fact, the 
statistical significance of THREAT coefficients disappears at
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any conventional levels once t-statistics are calculated by 
bootstrap standard errors. Perhaps the most disappointing 
result for the free cash flow hypothesis is the coefficient 
estimates of CF/EQ and of four growth variables (SALESGR). 
All these variables are associated with statistically 
insignificant coefficients; moreover, the signs of 
coefficients, with the exception of SALESGR4, are all 
inconsistent with the prediction of free cash flow hypothesis. 
That is, CF/EQ produces a negative sign and SALESGR yields a 
positive sign (except for SALESGR4, which has an anticipated 
negative sign) in all four equations.
Overall, the results are discouraging for the Jensen's 
free cash flow argument. None of the estimated coefficients 
on CF/EQ and SALESGR are significant, and all but SALESGR4 
carry signs inconsistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
The estimated coefficients of THREAT, on the other hand, all 
have the expected positive sign, but none are significantly 
different from 0.
The results support the tax savings rationale for 
buyouts, however. TAX/EQ enters four equations with an 
expected positive sign and is statistically significant in all 
the equations.
3.4.6 Determinants of the Premiums Paid in
Going-Private Transactions: OLS Regression Analysis
The prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis is not limited
to explaining variations in the likelihood of going private.
Consequently, a conclusion, based on the previous section's
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finding/ would be incomplete. One should also examine the 
ability of the free cash flow hypothesis to explain cross- 
sectional variation in premiums paid in these transactions. 
If the mitigation of agency problems associated with free cash 
flows is a major source of stockholders' gains in buyout 
transactions, then premiums paid in these transactions should 
be directly related to the level of the target's free cash 
flow. A similar argument holds for the target's tax 
obligation if tax savings are indeed an important source of 
stockholders' gains in going-private transactions.
Hence, in the following paragraphs, the premiums paid in 
21 re-LBO transactions are estimated as a function of CF/EQ, 
TAX/EQ, and SALESGR. Table 3.6 reports the results from 
ordinary least-squares regressions of the premiums on the 
three explanatory variables.4 As in logistic regression 
analysis, a different SALESGR variable is used in each model.
The results are inconsistent with both the free cash flow 
and the tax savings hypothesis. The coefficient on CF/EQ is 
significant only for the equation where SALESGR1 proxies the 
reinvestment opportunities of the firms. It does, however, 
have a negative sign contrary to Jensen's explanation. In all 
the remaining equations, CF/EQ appears to have no 
statistically significant explanatory power for the premiums 
and carries mixed signs.
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Table 3.6 
OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 
PREMIUMS PAID IN GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
INTERCEPT 0.4128(3.0730)* 0.3451(2.1700)** 0.5333(3.2270)* 0.4218(2.4300)**
CF/EQ -1.2984(-2.1380)** -0.4489(-0.7090) 0.0293(0.0660) 0.1448(0.2890)





R-Square 0.5263 0.3150 0.4137 0.2725
Adj R-Square 0.4427 0.1941 0.3102 0.1442
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively.
In contrast to its clear victory in explaining the 
likelihood of going private, coefficient estimates for TAX/EQ 
are not promising. TAX/EQ enters the third equation as a 
significantly (at 10% level) signed coefficient, but with an 
economically incorrect sign. The remaining coefficient 
estimates for this variable also carry mixed signs and are not 
significant.
Despite the fact that two major variables provide almost 
no explanatory power, R-square values of the models 
(especially for the first and the third models) are notably 
high. Model 1 has an R-square value of 52.63% (adjusted for 
degrees of freedom R-square value of 44.27%), and model 3 has
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an R-square value of 41.37% (adjusted R-square value of 
31.02). This finding suggests that the third explanatory 
variable of the model, SALESGR, is responsible for explaining 
the cross-sectional variation in the premiums paid in second 
buyouts.
This is indeed the case. SALESGR enters all the 
equations with a significant estimated coefficient. The 
coefficients of the SALESGR variable are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for equations 1 and 3f and at the 
5% level for equations 2 and 4.
The most intriguing aspect of the findings with respect 
to SALESGR is that it has a positive estimated coefficient in 
all four equations. This result is inconsistent with the free 
cash flow hypothesis. In a similar case, Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) argue that SALESGR may actually proxy for the tendency 
of managers to expend free cash flow on value-diminishing 
projects that expand the size of their firm. If so, the 
direct relationship between the PREMIUM and SALESGR can be 
interpreted as consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
In this explanation, however, it is not clear why managers are 
willing to pay (and, by the same token, how stockholders can 
demand) higher premium for a firm whose cash flows are already 
wasted in value-reducing projects.
As an alternative explanation, it is possible that 
SALESGR may be proxying for the future growth potential. 
Recall that these firms are experiencing their second buyouts
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after spending a relatively short period in the public arena 
following their first buyout. Accordingly, they might have 
gone through various organizational changes that could have 
enlarged their investment opportunity set both in the firm's 
current or diversified line of business. In essence, they are 
new firms. The upward trend in sales, combined with the fact 
that management wants to buy out the company, may therefore be 
a reflection of management's confidence in the future prospect 
and growth potential of the firm. Assuming that this fact has 
not been reflected in the stock price of the firm already, the 
positive relationship between the SALESGR and PREMIUM 
represents a revaluation of the firm's future growth prospects 
(or future cash flows).
3.5 A Comparison of Results Obtained from the re-LBO Sample 
with Lehn and Poulsen's Results
Recall that the only difference between the Lehn and Poulsen
study and the present one is the buyout samples. The samples
differ not only in terms of the time period they cover, but
also in terms of the nature of buyouts. That is, this study
uses a sample of re-LBOs rather than a sample of pure LBOs.
Therefore, our sample (21 observations) is noticeably smaller
than the sample of Lehn and Poulsen (244 observations). The
period that Lehn and Poulsen cover is 1980 to 1987. The
going-private transactions of our sample, on the other hand,
are spread through over the period 1986 to 1994.
Both studies investigate the relevance of Jensen's free 
cash flow hypothesis to LBOs. With the differences in the two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
samples, these two studies produce noticeably different 
results. First, the announcements of second LBO transactions 
generate a higher CAPE than those of first LBOs. For the 
event window -1 to +1, for example, the present study finds a 
CAPE of 29.08%. The corresponding figure is 16.30% in Lehn 
and Poulsen's study.
Second, Lehn and Poulsen find that the likelihood of 
going private is directly related to the ratio of free cash 
flow to equity value, and inversely related to the growth 
rates in sales. The same analysis is applied to our re-LBO 
sample and produces statistically insignificant coefficients 
for all the free cash flow proxies in explaining the 
likelihood of going private. The only variable that appears 
to have a significant role in the going-private decision is 
the one that proxies for the tax savings potential of a firm 
as a result of buyout, TAX/EQ. This result is consistent with 
the tax savings explanation of buyouts. That is, the wealth 
transfer from the IRS through reduced tax payments appears to 
be a driving force behind re-LBOs as well. The same cannot be 
concluded for the free cash flow hypothesis. The findings of 
the present study suggest that the irrelevancy of the free 
cash flow hypothesis to going-private transactions cannot be 
rejected.
Third, Lehn and Poulsen find a positive significant 
relation between the premium paid to shareholders and the free 
cash flow variable. They find the growth variable to be
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generally insignificant. It is significant, however, in one 
of the equations where it carries a positive sign contrary to 
the prediction of the free cash flow hypothesis. The results 
of the present study suggest that the premiums paid in the 
second buyouts are positively related to the growth rate in 
sales. This finding also contradicts Jensen's free cash flow 
hypothesis.
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examines the free cash flow hypothesis in 
management buyouts. If Jensen's free cash flow argument is an 
explanation for going-private transactions in general, it must 
be a major driving force behind re-LBOs as well. That is, 
regardless of a firm's past experience with LBOs, the free 
cash flow argument must also hold for the second LBOs.
Based on the examination of 21 re-LBO firms, the study 
finds no empirical support for the free cash flow hypothesis 
of going-private transactions. A comparison of these firms 
with a control sample suggests that the likelihood of going 
private is not related to the variables proxying the free cash 
flow. The tax savings argument of going-private transactions 
still holds, however, for the re-LBOs. The likelihood of 
going private for the second time is positively related to the 
tax savings potential of the firm. This relationship is 
statistically significant at the 5% level for all equations. 
This systematic significant association between TAX/EQ and the
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likelihood of going private is robust to bootstrap-estimated 
standard errors.
As opposed to its power in explaining the likelihood of 
going private, TAX/EQ fails to explain the variation in the 
premiums in a cross-sectional analysis. The only variable 
that appears to have explanatory power in explaining cross- 
sectional variation is sales growth (SALESGR). The most 
intriguing aspect of the findings with respect to SALESGR is 
that it has a positive estimated coefficient in all equations. 
This result is also inconsistent with the free cash flow 
hypothesis.
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) argue that the indirect 
relationship between the premium and sales growth may actually 
exist and they support Jensen's argument. They try to justify 
this argument by noting that the sales growth variable may be 
reflecting the tendency of managers to expend free cash flow 
on value-diminishing projects that expand the size of their 
firm. In this explanation, however, it is not clear why 
managers are willing to pay (and, by the same token, how 
stockholders can demand) higher premiums for a firm whose cash 
flows are already wasted in value-reducing projects.
As an alternative explanation, it is possible that 
SALESGR may be proxying for the future growth potential. 
Recall that these firms are experiencing their second buyouts 
after spending a relatively short period in the public arena 
following their first buyout. Accordingly, they might have
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gone through various organizational changes that could have 
enlarged their investment opportunity set both in the firm's 
current or diversified line of business. In essence, they are 
new firms. The upward trend in sales, combined with the fact 
that management wants to buy out the company, may therefore be 
a reflection of management's confidence in the future 
prospects and growth potential of the firm. Assuming that 
this fact has not been reflected in the stock price of the 
firm already, the positive relationship between the SALESGR 
and PREMIUM represents a revaluation of the firm's future 
growth prospects (or future cash flows) by the market.
Finally, the findings of the present study are consistent 
with those reported in earlier event studies of LBO
announcements. That is, the announcement of second LBOs is 
associated with positive average prediction errors. The
average magnitude of the reaction by the market, however, is 
somewhat above that reported by the prior LBO studies. This 
discrepancy might be due to the fact that a re-LBO transaction 
is quite different from a typical LBO. The initiation of a 
re-LBO transaction may contain additional information that is 
not present in LBOs.
3.7 Notes to Chapter 3
1. The use of SIC codes in defining industries is a widely
used practice in both accounting and finance literature.
It should be noted, however, that this classification
scheme is not perfect, and its accuracy has been
questioned frequently in the recent literature. For
example, Kahle and Walkling (1996) study differences in 
primary SIC codes for firms on Compustat and CRSP. They
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report that SIC classifications for the same firms differ 
on CRSP and Compustat for approximately 80% at the four­
digit level. Guenther and Rosman (1994) also find 
differences in SIC codes reported by Compustat and CRSP 
and conclude that these differences may affect the 
outcome of empirical research. Given such differences 
between the two major sources of SIC codes (Standard & 
Poor's Compustat and the University of Chicago's CRSP 
databases), it is difficult to rely on the premise that 
SIC classifications produce homogeneous industries.
2. See Jeong and Haddala (1993) for a discussion of
bootstrap applications in econometrics.
3. For a compact description of these test statistics, see 
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991).
4. The use of event-day prediction errors instead of
premiums did not provide any meaningful improvement on 
the estimated coefficients or their interpretations.
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Chapter 4
MANAGEMENT'S PERCEPTION OF BUYOUTS * A  SURVEY
4.1 Introduction
Management's belief that it can increase the market value of 
a firm through the buyout transaction reduces to an 
information asymmetry issue in an MM world where the MBO by 
itself cannot create value. As discussed in Frankfurter and 
Gunay (1993), managers and market participants perceive a 
different value for the firm. With the assumption that the 
firm is undervalued, ". . . management also expects real
economic gains from the buyout" (ibid, p. 33).
A gap between market value and true value may persist if 
management's information about a firm's operation is not (or 
may not be) credibly conveyed to shareholders. In the current 
study, management, the acquirer, is viewed as possessing 
valuable information that can be transformed into efficient 
changes in the firm's investment, production, and 
organizational activities. The asymmetric information 
hypothesis also implies increased operating income following 
the buyout (a finding that is attributed in earlier studies 
solely to increased efficiency due to private ownership). 
That is, because of their information advantage, managers 
might, before the buyout, see an opportunity to increase the 
value of the firm via operating improvements. But they defer 
implementation of these improvements until after the buyout, 
thereby reserving most of the gains for themselves. This,
63
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then, justifies the risk of paying too high a price and/or 
using massive leverage, obtained at high interest rates (see 
Madden et al., 1990).
Since the focus of this research is to investigate the 
information advantage of insiders, gains expected and realized 
by managers deserve particular attention. To capture the 
gains from investment, management seeks a way out of the LBO 
through one of the following exit mechanisms: liquidation, 
acquisition by an external party, private placing of shares, 
or issuance of stock. Since the consequences of each exit 
route may differ substantially, the eventual exit mechanism 
requires careful examination, presumably at the initiation 
stage of the buyout. This study focuses on only one exit 
route: issuance of stock.
In the reverse LBO, management, having achieved a 
substantial paper gain in the value of its equity after 
significantly increasing cash flow, sells the company back to 
the public. In addition to reducing the financial risk of the 
firm by lowering the leverage, reversing the LBO through stock 
market flotation affords the buyout investors, particularly 
managers, the opportunity to reduce their personal risk via 
portfolio diversification. This constitutes the first stage 
of the turnaround and is undertaken within a relatively short 
period of the initial buyout. Fuqua (1988) estimates the time 
of the first stage to be three to five years.
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According to Ferenbach (1987), on the other hand, private 
ownership lasts only one to two years. The transitory nature 
of the buyout might result from, among other things, the fact 
that the mechanism was undertaken to exploit the private 
information advantage. This point is also noted by Kaplan
(1991) who reports that, for the sample of 183 LBOs completed 
between 1979 and 1986, the median time spent as a private firm 
was 6.8 years. All of these indicate that buyouts are not 
permanent, but are transitory. This finding supports the view 
of the current study.
Re-LBO, in the context of the current study, refers to 
the whole cycle initiated with the buyout of a public company, 
followed by a public offering (reverse LBO), and ending with 
a second buyout. The re-LBO, or re-leveraging, owes much of 
its growing popularity to the existence of parties 
(financiers) to invest in deals. Of course, this situation is 
aided by the fact that the company, which has already 
successfully accomplished one round of leveraging, attracts 
these investors. As Cummings (1989) states, ". . . it has a 
track record for managing successfully in a mode that features 
high debt and a maximization of cash flow." The cycle implies 
that managers, with their information advantage, take the firm 
private when it is undervalued and bring it back to the market 
when it achieves an acceptable market value.
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4.2 The Undervaluation Hypothesis (H2)
As stated earlier, the purpose of this research is to 
investigate an observed phenomenon characterized by going 
private via MBO, reobtaining public status through an SIPO, 
and then going private a second time. Under the assumption 
that management possesses more information than shareholders, 
a company is taken private through an LBO and eventually 
brought back to the market. The initial buyout occurs because 
management, for whatever reason, believes that the market 
undervalues the firm. Hence, management sees an opportunity 
to come back with a price more consistent with its perceived 
value of the firm. This proposition is expressed as the first 
testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: LBOs are done because management
believes that the firm is undervalued.
4.2.1 Questionnaire Design
To discover the main incentive for an LBO, a survey of 
management's motivations regarding the buyout transaction was 
conducted. The objective of the survey was to investigate the 
CFO's perceptions of certain specific issues involved in 
buyouts. The statements used in the questionnaire, therefore, 
were drawn from interviews with managers of LBO firms in a 
variety of business publications as well as from previous 
research on MBOs.
The main point of interest in this survey is management's 
beliefs about the divergence between the "true" value and the
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market value of their firms. This so-called asymmetric 
information explanation of buyouts suggests that insiders have 
more or better information than the market. Several questions 
are used in the questionnaire to investigate this point. 
Statement 6, for example, asks respondents whether the
divergence between the market value and the "true" value of 
the firm's stock was the main motivation for the buyout. 
Statement 10 seeks opinions on whether managers view the firm 
as less valuable as a whole than as the sum of its parts. (In 
the absence of information asymmetries, either form should 
make no difference.)
Statements 3, 4, 15, and 16 also seek to ascertain the 
role of management's subjective beliefs in buyouts. In 
statement 15, CFOs are asked whether their company was
performing better than industry peers. In prior evidence, a 
common characteristic of buyout targets appears to be a 
successful past but recent inferior performance compared to a 
group of control firms.1 Statement 3 is essentially a portion 
of statement 10, and, hence, should provide complementary 
information. Statement 16 also fits into this group and has 
relevance for hypotheses 5 and 6 (in Chapter 5), since both 
hypotheses are based essentially on the premium paid to pre­
buyout shareholders. Statement 4 focuses on the role of
takeover specialists in an effort to determine whether their 
participation is necessary to determine and realize the gains 
in a buyout.2 A disagreement with this statement contradicts
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the view that buyout specialists are one of the driving forces 
behind improved efficiency in private organizations and may be 
considered another piece of indirect evidence of managers' 
information advantage.3
In reverse LBOs, management, having achieved a 
substantial paper gain in the value of its equity, sells the 
company back to the public. This cycle may indicate that 
managers, with their information advantage, take the firm 
private when it is undervalued and bring it back to the market 
when it achieves a market value acceptable to them. This 
happens, presumably, within a relatively short period, 
possibly decided at the initiation stage of the buyout. The 
transitory nature of the buyout might result from the fact 
that the mechanism was undertaken to exploit the private 
information advantage. Statements 13 and 14 explicitly deal 
with these issues, and again seek to gather information for H2 
and the remaining hypotheses in this study.
It is often indicated in the literature that managers may 
even distort the operating data through manipulation of 
accounting information to reduce the acquisition price. For 
example, Wu (1992), with a sample of 107 firms that were 
subject to an MBO proposal between 1980 and 1987, finds that 
managers depress operating income in the year before they 
propose the buyout. A corresponding decline in the stock 
price enables managers to buy the firm for a lower price. In 
an attempt to explore the management manipulation hypothesis,
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statement 7 is included in the questionnaire. The question is 
whether CFOs believe that there is any relation between the
premium offered and recent trends in reported earnings per
share.
Another reason for management's desire to take the firm 
private may be a takeover threat. Statement 5 asks the
opinion of respondents regarding the incumbent management
team's destiny in a target firm after a third-party hostile 
takeover, statement 12 further examines the "takeover threat" 
by asking managers whether their firm was subject to a 
takeover by an outside group. Note that a disagreement with 
statement 12 strengthens the role of other possible motives, 
including information asymmetry, in buyout transactions. That 
is, a management buyout initiated by a takeover threat is a 
self-preservation mechanism and attempts to block the hostile 
takeover attempt rather than exploit an information advantage. 
Shleifer and vishny (1988) argue that this is particularly 
true for very large firms where ". . . the primary impetus 
behind the MBO is often not the prospect of making a large 
acquisition profit, but rather the threat that someone will do 
so at management's expense" (ibid., p. 92).
There has been a growing debate about MBOs from a number 
of ethical perspectives (see Filatotchev et al., 1994; Jones 
and Hunt, 1991; Bruner and Paine, 1988; and Houston and Howe, 
1987, for example). Jones and Hunt (1991), in opposition to 
the utilitarian defense of buyouts, argue that such
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transactions do not maximize the net utility of all 
stakeholders affected by the deal or the net utility of 
society as a whole. In fact, a generally negative effect on 
social mores has been suggested. According to Filatotchev et 
al. (1994), this negative effect ". . .is epitomized in the 
description of corporate raiders as individuals who know the 
price of everything and the value of nothing!" This makes 
management motivation in buyouts suspect, at least from a 
moral perspective.
Statement 17 is drawn from Magowan's article (1989) on 
Safeway's LBO experience. (Magowan was the company's CEO and 
president.) Statement 17 seeks to determine whether managers 
accept the clear conflict in MBOs as opposed to an outside 
takeover. Managers may be well aware that the company's 
activities could be organized profitably, but they may be 
reluctant to do so without capturing the whole reward for 
their substantial efforts. Withholding the privileged 
information about potential value-additive activities and 
hence the true value of the firm allows them to bid a lower 
price in buying out the company. So, the ethical issues 
involved in buyouts and the undervaluation (asymmetric 
information) hypothesis are essentially linked.
Statements 2 and 11 also focus on ethical issues involved 
in buyout transactions. Statement 11 seeks to confirm the 
findings of Frankfurter and Gunay (1993) by directly asking 
managers whether the premium in a buyout is larger, ceteris
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paribus, when incumbent management also sells off some of its 
shares. Statement 2 makes the point that, in a buyout, 
management acts on both sides of the deal. On one side, it is 
the agent acting on behalf of the shareholders to determine 
whether both the sale of the firm and the offer price are in 
their best interest. On the other side, management acts 
according to "me-first" rules. This is clearly a conflict of 
interest stemming from a principal-agent relationship.
Statements 1, 8, and 9 focus on another conflict of 
interest that may be present between management and 
shareholders of publicly held companies. Statement 1 asserts 
that a buyout allows management to focus on long-term growth 
and profitability, whereas statement 8 states that outside 
shareholders exert pressure to increase earnings figures for 
the next quarters. Presumably, a buyout frees management from 
responsibility to, and demands from, stockholders. Management 
is no longer concerned about market pressures or short-term 
prospects. Without the obligation to create satisfying short­
term reports for stockholders, management can focus on long­
term growth and profitability.
For a sample of large MBOs, Lowenstein (1985) reports a 
median value of 10.4% management ownership following the 
buyout, compared with a median 3.8% before the transaction. 
This 10.4% management ownership is consistent with the 
findings of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) who report a 5% 
to 10% range of management ownership for the best performing
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firms. The conventional wisdom is that increased percentage 
ownership raises management's personal benefit from improving 
efficiency, and hence, induces management to squeeze 
additional value out of the firm's assets. Statement 9 seeks 
to determine whether the incentive of managers increases after 
the buyout.
4.2.2 Construction of the Survey Sample
The survey sample is constructed from 600 companies that have 
gone through an MBO. For the purposes of this study, an MBO 
is defined as the purchase of a corporation or a division by 
a group that includes some members of management; e.g., the 
board of directors and the top officers of the corporation.
The study covers the period 1980 to 1995. Several 
sources are used in constructing the sample:
(1) Going Public-The IPO Reporter, a publication of 
Investment Dealers Digest. The January 18, 1988, issue 
had a list of 45 reverse LBO firms.
(2) Mergers & Acquisitions. Various issues include a 
selected set of LBO companies that have gone public. The 
November/December 1987, November/December 1990, and 
November/December 1991 issues listed 44, 14, and 21 such 
firms, respectively.
(3) W.T. Grimm's Mergerstat Review. Eleven annual editions 
between 1985 and 1995 were used to identify MBO firms. 
Nine additional MBO firms were identified from pages 14- 
29 and page 77 in the 1990 edition.
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(4) The Yearbook on Corporate Mergers, Joint Ventures and 
Corporate Policy. This is an excellent source for the 
purpose at hand, but it was available for the years 1985, 
1986, and 1988 only.
(5) Investment Dealers Digest (IDD) Information Services. 
Mr. David Kwateng at IDD in New York provided a 
comprehensive, updated list of reverse LBOs that occurred 
in the period 1980 to 1996.
(6) Previous studies in the literature on MBOs. These 
identify a number of LBOs: 278 in Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989); 33 in Liebeskind, Wiersema, and Hansen (1992); 
and 51 in Opler (1992).
(7) Professor Chris J. Muscarella. He supplied a list of 90 
reverse LBOs generated by Kidder, Peabody & Co. in 1988. 
The final sample of MBOs includes those transactions that
satisfy the following criteria: The Wall Street Journal
contains an announcement that the company proposed to go 
private, wherein at least one member of the incumbent 
management team will have an equity interest. This search 
process yielded a sample of 600 firms eligible for the survey.
A mail questionnaire (see Appendix) including the 17 
closed-end statements discussed above was used to survey one 
of the following individuals in each company: the chief
financial officer, treasurer, or the vice president of 
finance.4 The possible response to each statement ranges, on 
a continuous scale, from strong disagreement (0) to strong
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agreement (4). The middle of the scale (2) represents the 
respondent's neutrality with regard to the statement, and the 
lack of a response entirely is interpreted to mean the 
statement is irrelevant for that firm. In order to improve 
the response rate and reduce potential non-response bias, a 
second mailing was sent within 4 to 6 weeks to those who did 
not reply initially.
Of the 600 firms originally selected for the sample, 33 
were excluded because of insufficient addresses, resulting in 
an initial sample of 567. The two completed mailings yielded 
a total of 131 valid responses, a 23% response rate. Table
4.1 (pages 75 and 76) presents a simple tabulation of the 
responses.
4.3 Results and Discussion
Table 4.1 shows the statements and the summary statistics 
derived from the responses. To provide an easy interpreta­
tion, statements are presented in the order of functional 
clusters discussed in Section 4.2.1 rather than in the order 
in which they appeared in the questionnaire. The first number 
attached to each statement indicates its order in the 
questionnaire. The number in parentheses, on the other hand, 
shows the rank of the statements sorted in descending order 
according to the rate of agreement. The first three columns 
following the statement present the frequency (as a percentage 
of all responses to that statement) of responses expressing 
disagreement (scale values smaller than 2), neutrality (scale


















MANAGEMENT'S PERCEPTION OF BUYOUTS: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE SURVEY
STATEMENT® DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE RATIOb MEAN MEDIAN MODE z-value0
6.(U)
Information Asymmetry
The main motivation for our buyout waa our 
opinion that prebuyout market prices of our stock did not reflect their "true* value.
34.4 11.5 54.1 1.57 2.23 2.45 3.00 1.38*
10.(5) A buyout la an appropriate strategy In a firm for which the partB are worth more than the whole.
13.1 16.9 70.0 5.35 2.68 3.00 3.00 6.99***
3.(4) It la easier for a private firm to Bell assetB or divisions than It Is for a publicly held company.
18.3 11.5 70.2 3.83 2.66 3.00 3.00 6.31***
4.
(14)
It is necessary to rely on outside 
consultants and takeover specialists to 
determine the gains of a buyout.
55.7 14.5 29.6 0.53 1.56 1.40 1.00 -3.21***
15.
(12) Before the buyout my company was performing better than comparable firms within the same 
industry.
29.9 16.5 53.5 1.79 2.20 2.20 2.00 2.48***
16.
<7)
Premiums paid to shareholders In a buyout are 
not necessarily indicative of the difference 
between the market value of the stock and 
management's belief about the "true" value of 
the stock.
13.1 20.0 66.9 5.12 2.51 2.65 3.00 6.73***
13.
(3)
The equity investors in a buyout usually go 
public again in three to five years. 6.2
20.0 73.8 12.00 2.68 3.00 3.00 8.49***
14.
(2) The equity Investors receive a return on their investment commensurate with the risk they take.
10.0 13.1 76.9 7.69 2.84 3.00 3.00 8.05***
7.(9) The premium offered is affected by the recent trend in reported earnings per share. 27.3 15.6 57.0 2.09 2.25 2.35 3.00 3.32***
























In a hostile takeover, Incumbent management of the target firm is replaced. 13.2 18.6 68.2
5.18 2.62 3.00 3.00 6.67***
12.
(16)
The main motivation in our buyout was that 
the firm was subject to a ho&tile takeover.
Ethical Issues
72.2 5.6 22.2 0.31 1.08 0.45 0.00 -6.11***
17.
(15)
There is an element of disloyalty in a 
management-led buyout since it amounts to 
admitting that management will do a better 
job for themselves than they did for shareholders.
53.5 18.9 27.6 0.51 1.54 1.70 2,00 -3.58***
2.
(13)
In management buyouts there is a conflict of interest on the part of the management in that it is acting on both sidea of the 
transaction as buyer and seller of a company.
37.7 19.2 43.1 1.14 2.02 2.00 2.00 0.58
11.
(17)
The premium in a buyout is larger, other things being equal, when incumbent management 
also sells off some of its shares.
Conflict of Interest
46.4 32.8 20.8 0.45 1.70 2.00 2.00 -4.00***
1.
(10)
A buyout allows management to focus on long­
term growth and profitability.
26.7 19.1 54.2 2.03 2.28 2.30 2.00 3.49***
8.
(1)
Outside shareholders exert pressure in a 
publicly held company to increase or at least 
maintain previous quarters' earnings figures.
5.3 5.3 89.3 16.71 3.15 3.20 3.00 9.88***
9.
(8)
Firm performance improves after a buyout because of a closer relation between 
management action and rewards.
22.1 13.7 64.1 2.90 2.57 2.80 3.00 5.17***
(a)Ths number that appeara within parentheaea attached to each atateaent diaplaya the rank of the statements if they were aorted in descending order according to their agreement rate.(b)Ratio for each atateaent la computed aa followai Number of Agreeing Respondents/Number of Diaagreeing Respondents.(c)z-value is the teat statistic for hypothesis that the proportions of agreeing and disagreeing respondents for each statement are equal.* Significant at 108 level, ** significant at 58 level, and *** significant at 1% level.
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value 2), and agreement (scale values greater than 2), 
respectively. Also displayed in columns 5 through 8 are the 
ratio of agreement to disagreement responses, the mean, the 
median, and the mode for each statement. The last column 
provides test statistics and associated table values for the 
hypothesis that the proportion of agreeing and disagreeing 
respondents is equal. Put another way, agreeing respondents 
expressed as the percentage of agreeing plus disagreeing 
respondents is hypothesized to be equal to 0.5. Since the 
following discussion focuses on the agreement versus 
disagreement rate for each statement, it might be informative 
to note that, except for statements 2 and 6, all the 
statements are associated with a significant z-value.
Evidence of underpricing of the firm's equity relative to 
fundamental value is tenuous, possibly because it "runs 
counter to the efficient market hypothesis, which has been the 
bedrock of financial economics for many years" (Shleifer and 
vishny, 1988). Of particular interest are those statements 
that attempt to determine the undervalued stock/firm 
perception by management.
The statistics for statements 6 and 10 show that, in the 
making of buyout decisions, divergence between the market and 
perceived value of the firm plays an important role. The 
majority of respondents agree with both of these statements. 
In fact, statement 10, having an agreement rate of 70%, is 
among those showing the highest percentage of agreement.
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There is a very close agreement rate for statement 3 (70.2%) 
which/ as discussed before, was introduced as a complement to 
statement 10.
Statements 15 and 16 are also in agreement, which is 
particularly substantial for statement 16 (a 66.9% agreement 
frequency and a ratio of 5.12). Proponents of LBOs argue 
that, in new private organization, there is a significant 
efficiency improvement. This, in turn, is realized as a value 
gain, part of which accrues to pre-buyout shareholders in the 
form of premium (somewhere around 50%) over the prevailing 
market price of the stock. Of course, a sudden enormous gain 
is definitely desirable by shareholders and fits one of the 
core assumptions of corporate finance in that the objective of 
management is to increase the value of the stock/firm. 
However, as reflected in statement 16, managers do not deny 
that they do not let all the potential gain flow to 
shareholders.
As far as statement 15 is concerned, recall that a 
successful past, followed by a recent inferior performance, is 
a common characteristic of buyout targets. Moreover, Wu
(1992) reports a management-induced depression in operating 
income, with a corresponding decline in stock price in the 
year before the buyout proposal. These facts suggest that 
management's opinion that the company is performing better 
than industry peers is formed mainly by their "subjective 
beliefs" and/or private information rather than stock market
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or publicly available financial measures; or, they want to 
hide their intention. It would be useful to study, 
separately, the responses at the two extremes, using 
accounting and market data.
Many, if not all, the questions discussed above are 
designed to address the undervaluation hypothesis, which seems 
to be supported by the analysis so far. That is, the firm is 
perceived to be more valuable as parts than as a whole, the 
pre-buyout market price does not reflect the "true" value of 
the stock, and the premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders do 
not exhaust the gains to be realized by managers. In fact, as 
the results for statement 14 indicate, 76.9% of the 
respondents view management buyouts as highly profitable 
strategies, providing them with a sufficient return to cover 
not only their effort but also the risk they face.
Statement 13 ties in with statement 14 and provides 
support for both the first and second hypotheses. Combined, 
these two hypotheses can be restated as follows: LBOs are
induced by perceived undervaluation of the firm by management 
whose intention is to realize a profit with the company going 
public again. Three to five years' life expectancy for the 
private form (emphasized in statement 13) receives an 
agreement rate of 73.8%, which is the third highest among the 
17 questions covered in the survey, and has an agreement-to- 
disagreement ratio of 12. This result supports the idea put 
forth by Ainina and Mohan (1991) that the buyout is ". . .a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
process which implies that superior information is held by the 
insiders who decide when to exit and enter the public market" 
(ibid., p. 394). Such a strategy definitely runs counter to 
the many explanations for going-private transactions given in 
earlier studies because their strong argument on the behalf of 
going private transactions has no room for a quick return to 
public markets. These explanations include, for example, 
savings of public-ownership expenses, increased managerial 
ownership (convergence of interest), and buyout specialist 
monitoring.
The highest rate of disagreement, 72.2% and 55.7%, is 
with statements 12 and 4, respectively. Contrary to common 
belief and previous empirical findings, statement 4, with a 
0.53 agreement-to-disagreement ratio, indicates that outside 
consultants and/or takeover specialists are not considered 
important to the success of a buyout. Responses to statement 
12 indicate that a third-party hostile takeover attempt is not 
the main reason for an MBO. This finding strengthens other 
possible explanations for a buyout, including the information 
advantage of managers. It also removes any potential bias 
that might have been brought in by the dominance of "hostile 
takeover" MBOs in the survey group. As reflected in a 68.2% 
agreement frequency and a 5.18 agreement-to-disagreement 
ratio, the response to statement 5 indicates that managers 
view hostile takeovers as a definite threat.
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A less common version of the asymmetric information view 
argues that managers misrepresent pre-MBO earnings to make the 
company appear unattractive, thereby reducing the purchase 
price. Although they do not provide direct evidence in 
support of this view, the responses to statement 7 do indicate 
that managers believe that the recent trend in reported 
earnings is an important determinant of the premium offered to 
pre-buyout shareholders. This finding, together with the 
conclusion of Wu (1992), implies that there is a great deal of 
incentive to distort accounting information.
Statements 2, 11, and 17 address the ethical issues
involved in the management-led going-private transactions. A 
common feature of the responses to these statements is the 
high neutrality rate. In a range of 5.3% to 32.8% for 
neutrality for the entire set of statements in the survey, 
statements 11, 2, and 17 have a rate of 32.8%, 19.2%, and 
18.9%, respectively. Overall, the evidence on the ethical 
side of the buyouts is somewhat mixed: the respondents tend to 
agree there is a conflict of interest in MBOs as managers act 
as both buyers (in their own interest) and as sellers (in the 
stockholders' interest) in the same deal. They do not view 
buyout transactions as a shrugging off of fiduciarial 
responsibilities, however. In fact, inherent in an MBO, there 
appears to be the expectation that "we can and will do a 
better job for ourselves than we did for shareholders." In 
addition to providing an idea about management's opinion on
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the ethical issues involved in MBOs, the responses to these 
statements can be considered valuable evidence (as reflected 
by the high neutrality rate for all three statements and a 
dominating disagreement rate for statements 11 and 17) that 
the questionnaires were responded to by knowledgeable people.
The last group of statements, 1, 8, and 9, pertain to 
possible conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders. Statement 8, with a 89.3% frequency rate, 
receives the highest agreement among all statements of the 
survey. The obligation to satisfy stockholders through short­
term earnings performance acts as a clear constraint and is 
somewhat troublesome to managers. As an a priori expectation 
grouped with statement 8, statement 1 (although not as strong 
as its counterpart) also receives an agreement from 
respondents. It has an agreement frequency of 54.2% and an 
agreement-to-disagreement ratio of 2.03. As mentioned, 
statement 9 also aims to shed light on the conflict-of- 
interest dimension of the MBOs. The increased equity 
ownership of management, together with its investment of human 
capital in the firm, can act as a powerful incentive. Under 
this scenario, managers' decisions will unambiguously aim to 
increase the firm value as opposed to counteracting objectives 
that may be pursued in the pre-LBO firm. This statement 
receives a 64.1% agreement frequency and a 2.90 agreement-to- 
disagreement ratio, supporting the convergence of interest 
hypothesis (i.e., agency theory) in corporate finance.
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4.3.1 Factor Analysis and Clustering
Factor analysis is generally used to summarize or condense the 
information in a large set of variables into a set of 
components, which/ in turn, enables the analyst to examine the 
common underlying patterns in the data. In the present 
context, the objective is not to identify or name the 
underlying factors, but rather to use the information to group 
respondents into several clusters of shared perceptions. The 
lack of significant differences among these clusters with 
respect to any of the survey statements should reveal a 
homogeneity in management's perceptions.
The results of principal component factor analysis are 
presented in Table 4.2. Eigen values, percentage of variance, 
and the accounted-for cumulative percentage of total variance 
are shown in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
The latent root criterion suggests retaining those 
components having Eigen values greater than 1.0. This 
selection results in six components, which account for 57.2% 
of the total variance. The Eigen values indicate the relative 
importance of each factor in accounting for the variance 
associated with the set of variables. Factor 1, having the 
highest Eigen value, accounts for most of the explanation of 
the variance, 13.6%. The total amount of variance extracted 
by six factors is 9.71.
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Table 4.2
RESULTS FOR THE EXTRACTION OF COMPONENTS
Factor Eigen Value Percentage of Variance CumulativePercentage
1 2.30885 13.6 13.6
2 1.85333 10.9 24.5
3 1.76949 10.4 34.9
4 1.41367 8.3 43.2
5 1.29173 7.6 50.8
6 1.08156 6.4 57.2
7 .96512 5.7 62.8
8 .91030 5.4 68.2
9 .82038 4.8 73.0
10 .78305 4.6 77.6
11 .74342 4.4 82.0
12 .70954 4.2 86.2
13 .57535 3.4 89.6
14 .53491 3.1 92.7
15 .45888 2.7 95.4
16 .42003 2.5 97.9
17 .36039 2.1 100.0
A supporting device to decide how many principal
components to retain is the scree curve. Figure 4.1 presents
the scree curve that plots the Eigen values associated with 
each component in successive order of its extraction. Results 
of the scree test in this case suggest two additional factors 
since it appears that a break occurs after the eighth factor. 
Moreover, the Eigen values for these two factors, which are 
0.965 and 0.910, respectively, are very close to the latent 
root criterion value of 1.0. The following analysis is based 
on these two extra factors as well. The eight factors explain 
68.2% of the total variation.
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Figure 4.1 
SCREE CURVE OF EIGEN VALUES
Component loadings for the eight factors are displayed in 
Table 4.3. The underlined values represent each variable's 
highest loading (in absolute value). In some cases, the 
values represent the two highest loadings if they are similar 
in size. The last column, designated communality, summarizes 
how each variable is explained by the eight factors extracted. 
Communalities associated with statements 1-2, 4-9, 11-14, and 
16-17 are all at or above 0.63.5 This indicates that a large 
portion of the variance in these statements has been extracted 
by the present factor solution. The communality figures for 
statements 3, 10, and 15 are smaller, however, suggesting that 
they have less in common with the other statements.
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Table 4.3
UNROTATED COMPONENT LOADINGS AND COMMUNALITIES
Factors
CommunalityStatement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 .473 -.200 -.253 .473 .174 .211 .114 .159 0.665
2 .544 .296 -.052 -.485 -.062 .168 -.014 -.035 0.657
3 .472 -.202 -.073 .043 -.484 -.257 .143 -.044 0.594
4 .278 .411 -.072 .441 -.377 .160 -.067 .137 0.639
5 .146 .252 .493 -.039 -.010 -.216 -.087 -.693 0.866
6 .276 .157 -.175 .232 .610 .200 -.170 -.064 0.631
7 .353 .322 .190 .187 .193 -.369 .531 .157 0.781
8 .274 .066 .269 -.455 .409 .000 .393 .157 0.707
9 .562 -.540 .200 .110 .029 .036 -.090 -.092 0.680
10 .422 -.318 .179 .008 -.328 .337 .224 -.107 0.596
11 .301 .369 .481 .367 .048 .158 -.200 -.052 0.665
12 -.104 -.244 .618 -.055 -.198 -.181 -.225 .462 0.794
13 -.279 -.052 .627 .165 -.040 .235 .264 .024 0.630
14 .011 -.650 .321 .070 .373 -.011 -.191 -.019 0.709
15 -.423 .301 .188 .412 .066 -.189 .059 .038 0.521
16 -.387 .155 .194 -.150 -.078 .654 .158 -.012 0.694
17 .427 .431 .225 -.287 .014 .002 -.409 .297 0.758
An initial examination of the factor loading pattern 
reveals that a clear-cut interpretation is difficult since, in 
many cases, different factors get almost the same amount of 
loading from the same variable. This necessitates a rotation 
of the factor matrix to redistribute the variance so that a 
simple loading pattern can be reproduced for an unambiguous 
interpretation.
The results of the orthogonal varimax rotation method are 
shown in Table 4.4.® The highest loading for each variable 
(in absolute value) across the eight factors is underlined.
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Table 4.4 
VARIMAX ROTATED COMPONENT LOADINGS
Statement:
Factors
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 .425 -.129 .238 -.105 -.154 .510 -.307 .144
2 .188 .746 .048 -.211 -.002 -.020 .077 .105
3 .518 .040 .211 -.034 -.396 -.329 .014 .107
4 .077 .066 .788 -.037 -.015 .061 -.019 .018
5 .033 .062 -.022 -.031 -.013 -.049 .923 .070
6 -.076 .104 .006 -.177 -.064 .758 .019 .052
7 -.009 -.005 .170 -.007 -.155 .056 .095 .845
8 .062 .398 -.405 .039 .178 .078 -.010 .583
9 .699 .016 -.134 .232 -.219 .245 .102 -.016
10 .733 .068 .091 -.002 .189 -.090 .026 .024
11 .050 .116 .459 .279 .155 .361 .434 .129
12 .032 .008 -.038 .855 .042 -.238 -.017 .009
13 .074 -.293 .009 .347 .581 -.079 .190 .191
14 .281 -.244 -.502 .434 -.044 .329 .059 -.119
15 -.455 -.421 .240 .137 .103 .013 .153 .159
16 -.077 .039 .021 -.073 .807 -.075 -.050 -.145
17 -.124 .740 .229 .319 -.096 .127 .105 .052
Statements loading on factor 1 are 3, 9, 10, and 15. Notice
that, except for 9, these statements have been presumed to be 
related to the undervaluation hypothesis of LBOs. Also 
noticeable is the negative sign of statement 15's loading.
Factor 2 is dominated by statements 2 and 17. Both of 
these statements are assumed to be related to ethical issues 
in management-led buyouts. The third statement, statement 11, 
included in this group as a priori, however, loads on factor 
3, along with statements 4 and 14. Interestingly, the 
negative sign of 14 may be interpreted (considered with
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statement 4) that management believes that there is a 
sufficient return for equity investors in buyouts and that 
they do not want to share it with buyout specialists.
The only underlying statement of factor 4 is statement 12 
with its significant loading of 0.855. Factor 7 is the only 
other component that attracts just one statement (statement 
5). These two statements were grouped together a priori with 
the expectation that they would capture the third-party, 
hostile-takeover dimension of the buyouts.
Factor 5 is loaded with statements 13 and 16. Although 
they were covered in different groups in the initial 
discussion, these two statements also address the 
under valuation/asymmetric information issue. Statement 6, 
which deals directly with undervaluation of stock prior to the 
buyout, and statement 1 load together on factor 6. Factor 8 
captures the remaining two statements, 7 and 8.
Being, in a sense, a condensed representation of several 
statements, the eight factors are all believed to be the most 
relevant variables in characterizing the objects to be 
clustered. The factor scores, therefore, are saved for use in 
the following cluster analysis. This search should indicate 
whether the respondents can be partitioned into relatively 
homogeneous subsets based on the interobject similarities. 
The objective, therefore, is to specify the number of clusters 
and examine their similarities.
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In the absence of a priori information or expectation 
about the number of groups that may prevail, the first step in 
the analysis takes an exploratory path and aims to ascertain 
the number of groups, in partitioning the data, two different 
interobject similarity measures (Euclidian distance and 
squared Euclidian distance) and two different clustering 
algorithms (average linkage and Ward's method) are used.
At first, an agglomerative hierarchical procedure is run 
for each of the algorithms in the aforementioned statement. 
Since the results of the average linkage method do not 
indicate any meaningful grouping of the sample, the remaining 
analysis concentrates on the two Ward techniques. Table 4.5 
provides the percentage change in agglomeration coefficients 
for the two different ward techniques used in hierarchical 
algorithms.
Table 4.5
ANALYSIS OF AGGLOMERATION COEFFICIENTS: 
HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING
Percentage Change Coefficient toin Agglomeration Next Level
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The relative increases in the clustering coefficient for 
10 to 2 clusters displayed in the first column of Table 4.5 
suggest five or fewer data groupings. The second column/ on 
the other hand, indicates a lower number of groupings (2 or 
possibly none). Note that the conclusion of no grouping (or 
the existence of a single group only) is consistent with the 
results of average linkage models since they did not suggest 
any number of data groupings, either. As stated by Hair et 
al. (1992), however, ". . . cluster analysis, along with
factor analysis, is much more of an art than a science." The 
findings of hierarchical methods are complemented, therefore, 
by a set of non-hierarchical runs to fine-tune the results.
In hierarchical algorithms, once an object joins a 
cluster, it is never removed and is fused with other objects 
belonging to some other clusters. Thus, undesired early 
combinations may lead to artificial results. Unlike 
hierarchical techniques, non-hierarchical techniques do not 
require that the allocation of an object to a cluster be 
irrevocable. For each of the potential groupings (2 to 5) 
suggested by hierarchical cluster analysis, a non-hierarchical 
clustering process is run. For the extracted groups, then, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) model is applied 
for all 17 statements being studied. This application is 
intended to reveal whether the mean vector for at least one 
cluster is statistically significantly different from the mean 
vectors of the other clusters.
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Regardless of which number of groupings between 2 to 5 is 
selected, significant differences are observed among clusters. 
In Table 4.6, however, only the results for the three-cluster 
case is reported. Although, there is no particular reason for 
reporting only the three-group clustering, this clustering is 
the only one to generate a relatively equal number of cells, 
which is an important requirement for the subsequent 
univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) to be meaningful. As 
Panel B of Table 4.6 shows, differences among the three groups 
are significant with respect to statements 1-3, 5-7, 9-11, 13, 
and 15-17.
The majority of the statistically significant differences 
among groups, however, stems not from directly opposing views 
(i.e., disagreement versus agreement), but rather from the 
strength of the consensus [i.e., one cluster agrees (or 
disagrees) with the statement more than other(s) measured by 
the cluster means]. Specifically, as shown in Panel B of 
Table 4.6, the mean values of the three groups in statements 
3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 13 are either below 2 (disagree) or 
above 2 (agree); that is, the direction of the opinion is the 
same. For example, mean values of three clusters suggest that 
they all agree with statement 3 that a private firm can sell 
assets/divisions easier than a publicly held company. 
Statistically significant difference is due to the strength of 
the agreement (3.05, 2.96, and 2.10 for clusters 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively), rather than to the divergence of opinions.
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Table 4.6
MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE OF THREE CLUSTERS











Pillai 's Trace 1.229 8.643 34 184 0.0001
Hotelling- Lawley Trace
3.210 8.498 34 180 0.0001
Wilk3' Lambda 0.148 8.570 34 182 0.0001
Roy's ( 
Root Sreatest 1.750 9.472 17 92 0.0001
PANEL B: Univariate F Tests
Mean Value*,b
Statement WholeSample Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 F Significance Statistic of F Statistic
1 2.22 1.86 2.61 2.28 5.15 .0071
2 2.05 2.49 2.28 1.24 14.83 .0001
3 2.73 3.05 2.96 2.10 8.77 .0003
4 1.55 1.65 1.58 1.41 0.50 .6063
5 2.59 2.84 2.78 2.08 9.32 .0002
6 2.18 1.58 2.80 2.34 12.15 .0001
7 2.26 2.03 2.68 2.14 5.61 .0048
8 3.22 3.20 3.27 3.19 0.13 .8804
9 2.52 2.66 2.81 2.05 6.04 .0033
10 2.68 3.08 2.35 2.51 9.40 .0002
11 1.71 1.72 1.94 1.46 3.12 .0483
12 1.16 1.20 1.02 1.25 0.29 .7491
13 2.SI 2.85 2.37 2.75 4.22 .0171
14 2.79 2.70 2.83 2.88 0.39 .6765
15 2.17 1.84 1.94 2.83 8.40 .0004
16 2.53 2.81 1.91 2.80 18.02 .0001
17 1.53 1.56 2.01 1.00 7.40 .0010
(a) Whole sample mean is based on 110 observations, since in multivariate analysis SAS does not take into account cases with missing values.(b) The number of respondents in clusters 1, 2, and 3 are 43, 34, and 33, respectively.
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4.3.2 LBO Group versus Reverse LBO Group
The results in the previous section clearly indicate that 
managers are not homogeneous in their perceptions with respect 
to all the statements involved. In fact, they show a 
significant diversity on those statements that are directly 
applicable to the undervaluation hypothesis.
Without knowing certain characteristics of the firms in 
these three clusters, the conclusions drawn from the above 
analyses remain somewhat limited. This question will be re­
addressed in section 4.3.3 in the discussion of buyout 
decisions in value versus glamour stocks. The present section 
investigates a possible discrepancy between the following two 
groups of managers' perceptions: the LBO group and the reverse 
LBO group. In the context of hypotheses 2 (of the current 
chapter) and 3 (of Chapter 5), perception differences among 
the managers of these two groups are particularly important. 
Although hypothesis 4 (of Chapter 5) is applicable to only 
reverse LBO firms (since a re-LBO firm must become a reverse 
LBO firm first), hypotheses 2 and 3 make no such distinction 
and simply state that the firm is bought out by managers 
because of their subjective beliefs about the true value of 
their firm, and that the firm will be brought to the market to 
realize the gain.
Table 4.7 displays cross-tabulations of LBO and reverse 
LBO groups for the 17 statements of the survey to show the 
responses to each question for these two groups. If there
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Table 4.7
CROSS TABULATION RESULTS OF 17 STATEMENTS BY LBO AND
REVERSE LBO GROUPS
Whole Reverse X2Statement Consensus Sample* LBO Groupb LBO Group0 (p-value)
DISAGREEMENT 26.7 30.61 24.39 0.911 NEUTRALITY 19.1 20.41 18.29 (.63)AGREEMENT 54.2 48.98 57.32
DISAGREEMENT 37.7 44.90 33.33 2.182 NEUTRALITY 19.2 14.29 22.22 (.34)AGREEMENT 43.1 40.82 44.44
DISAGREEMENT 18.3 18.37 18.29 0.123 NEUTRALITY 11.5 10.20 12.20 (.94)AGREEMENT 70.2 71.43 69.51
DISAGREEMENT 55.7 57.14 54.88 3.324 NEUTRALITY 14.5 20.41 10.98 (.19)AGREEMENT 29.8 22.45 34.15
DISAGREEMENT 13.2 18.37 10.00 2.325 NEUTRALITY 18.6 20.41 17.50 (.31)AGREEMENT 68.2 61.22 72.50
DISAGREEMENT 34.4 29.79 37.33 0.756 NEUTRALITY 11.5 12.77 10.67 (.69)AGREEMENT 54.1 57.45 52.00
DISAGREEMENT 27.3 31.25 25.00 0.817 NEUTRALITY 15.6 16.67 15.00 (.67)AGREEMENT 57.0 52.08 60.00
DISAGREEMENT 5.3 4.08 6.10 0.328 NEUTRALITY 5.3 6.12 4.88 (.85)AGREEMENT 89.3 89.80 89.02
DISAGREEMENT 22.1 26.53 19.51 1.409 NEUTRALITY 13.7 10.20 15.85 (.49)AGREEMENT 64.1 63.27 64.63
DISAGREEMENT 13.1 12.50 13.41 0.1910 NEUTRALITY 16.9 18.75 15.85 (.91)AGREEMENT 70.0 68.75 70.73
DISAGREEMENT 46.4 46.81 46.15 1.4211 NEUTRALITY 32.8 27.66 35.90 (.49)AGREEMENT 20.8 25.53 17.95
DISAGREEMENT 72.2 71.43 72.73 1.1112 NEUTRALITY 5.6 8.16 3.90 (.58)AGREEMENT 22.2 20.41 23.38
DISAGREEMENT 6.2 10.42 3.66 2.5413 NEUTRALITY 20.0 20.83 19.51 (.28)AGREEMENT 73.8 68.75 76.83
DISAGREEMENT 10.0 12.50 8.54 0.7714 NEUTRALITY 13.1 14.58 12.20 (.68)AGREEMENT 76.9 72.92 79.27
DISAGREEMENT 29.9 27.08 31.65 0.7215 NEUTRALITY 16.5 14.58 17.72 (.69)AGREEMENT 53.5 58.33 50.63
DISAGREEMENT 13.1 14.29 12.35 1.2616 NEUTRALITY 20.0 24.49 17.28 (.53)AGREEMENT 66.9 61.22 70.37
DISAGREEMENT 53.5 53.06 53.85 3.3517 NEUTRALITY 18.9 12.24 23.08 (.19)AGREEMENT 27.6 34.69 23.08
a, b, and c reflect percentage (%) values.
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were no bias arising from the group differences, one would 
expect the proportion of the survey sample agreeing with each 
statement to be the same for LBO and reverse LBO firms. Chi- 
square analysis is used to test for differences in the 
responses between the two groups. These statistical tests 
show that the responses of the LBO group and reverse LBO group 
do not differ significantly at conventional levels of 
significance.
The results of the cross-frequency tables are 
substantiated by a MANOVA to test the null hypothesis of 
equality of vector means across the groups designated by 
buyout stage; i.e., LBO versus reverse LBO. Findings are 
reported in Panel A of Table 4.8. Similarly, Panel B presents 
the univariate ANOVA results applied to 17 statements to 
detect the mean difference between the two groups of 
respondents.
In line with prior expectations, the F-statistics do not 
show any statistically significant differences between LBO and 
reverse LBO groups. Moreover, even the direction of consensus 
(i.e., disagreement, neutrality, and agreement) does not 
varybetween the groups; that is, the mean values of all 
statements (but statement 2) are either above or below 2 for 
both groups simultaneously. It should be noted, however, that 
p-value for statement 13 is 0.071. Although this is above
0.05, it is interesting nevertheless in light of the question 
and group means which are 2.78 for reverse LBOs and 2.51 for
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Table 4.8
MANOVA SUMMARY TABLE OF LBO VERSUS REVERSE LBO GROUPING











Pillai's Trace 0.112 0.681 17 92 .8140
Hotelling- Lawley Trace
0.126 0.681 17 92 .8140
Wilks' Lambda 0.888 0.681 17 92 .8140
Roy's Greatest 
Root
0.126 0.681 17 92 .8140
PANEL B: Univariate F Tests
Mean Valuea'b
Statement WholeSample Reverse LBO Group LBOGroup FStatistic Significance of F Statistic
1 2.22 2.19 2.25 0.07 .7863
2 2.05 2.11 1.96 0.39 .5311
3 2.73 2.76 2.69 0.09 .7609
4 1.55 1.56 1.55 0.01 .9407
5 2.59 2.66 2.50 0.84 .8625
6 2.18 2.15 2.22 0.09 .7659
7 2.26 2.35 2.14 1.38 .2423
8 3.22 3.27 3.13 1.04 .3111
9 2.52 2.58 2.44 0.49 .4849
10 2.68 2.75 2.59 0.93 .3374
11 1.71 1.66 1.79 0.68 .4127
12 1.16 1.15 1.17 0.01 .9436
13 2.67 2.78 2.51 3.33 .0710*
14 2 .79 2.83 2.74 0.28 .5978
15 2.17 2.06 2.33 1.28 .2600
16 2.53 2.55 2.50 0.08 .7757
17 1.53 1.42 1.70 1.59 .2093
(a) Whole sample mean is based on 110 observations, since in multivariate analysis SAS does not take into account cases with missing values.(b) The number of respondents in reverse LBO group and LBO group are 66 and 44, respectively.* Significant at 10% level.
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LBOs. With this exception, the overall results suggest that 
firms that reverse their LBO are not in a special class, at 
least along the dimensions covered by the survey.
4.3.3 Buyout Decisions in Value versus Glamour Stocks
Despite its history in finance and security analysis, market- 
to-book value of equity, MV/BV, has become popular only 
recently following Fama and French (1992).7 They conclude 
that stock returns can be explained by two measures that do 
not incorporate beta: size and MV/BV, the latter having the 
largest effect. This conclusion is not limited to markets in 
the United States, but applies also to those of Japan, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland [see 
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991; and Capaul, Rowley, and 
Sharpe, 1993].
Apart from its apparent role in empirical studies, 
however, MV/BV lacks a consensus as a satisfactory economic 
explanation. Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993) introduce 
MV/BV as the variable that differentiates value and growth 
stocks. Favorable growth prospects raise a firm's stock price 
and, therefore, induce a high MV/BV ratio. Similarly, a low 
MV/BV is likely to be associated with high asset value and 
less growth potential. A second view capitalizes on 
mispricing by the market and suggests that a low (high) MV/BV 
characterizes undervalued (overvalued) stocks.
Lehn and Poulsen (1988) observe that buyouts are most 
likely to occur in mature industries with stable cash flows
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
but limited growth opportunities. Retail, textiles, food, 
apparel, and bottled and canned soft drinks are the five 
categories of industries that collectively contain 46.2% of 
the firms that account for 46.8% of the value of the 106 LBOs 
included in their sample. Studies by Maupin, Bidwell, and 
Ortegren (1984), Kieschnik (1989), and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 
all support the notion that targets of going-private 
transactions are characterized by lower growth rates (in sales 
and employment) and lower market-to-book ratios than other 
firms in the same industry. These facts, coupled with the 
discussion above, suggest that investigating differences in 
managers' attitudes across firms grouped by market-to-book 
value (MV/BV) may provide additional insights into the 
analysis.
The ratio for each firm is measured for the accounting 
year immediately preceding the buyout announcement rather than 
for the present time. This is because respondents, 
presumably, have evaluated the survey statements in the light 
of the going-private decision, which must be associated (if 
related at all) with market-to-book value of the equity at the 
time of the buyout. Following Fama and French (1992), the 
book value of common equity is proxied by Compustat data item 
60. Market value of the common equity is calculated by using 
the closing share price and the number of shares outstanding 
as of December. Only for 58 firms is data available at both 
the accounting and market level in CRSP, Compustat,
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Lexis/Nexis, Moody's, and S&P Stock Reporter.8 The lack of 
data for the remaining 73 firms is mainly due to the fact that 
they are divisional MBOs. The inclusion of such buyouts in 
the main sample of the study was unavoidable since they are 
the major contributor to the reverse LBO sample, and hence, to 
the re-LBO sample as well, which are direct interests of the 
study. The cut-off value for grouping the firms is the median 
MV/BV of these 58 firms, 1.1549. The main impetus for using 
the median value was to obtain groups with an equal number of 
observations. The following table presents summary statistics 
on market value of equity, book value of equity, and MV/BV 
ratio.
Table 4.9
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET-BASED MEASURES
FOR 58 MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS
Measure Minimum Mean Median Maximum
Book Value of 
Assets ($000)
21,830.0 629,854.9 259,273.0 6,183,000.0
Market Value of 
Equity ($000)
3,916.0 328,673.2 155,705.4 2,563,953.0
Book Value of 
Equity ($000)
8,337.0 258,381.5 118,015.5 1,946,000.0
Ratio of 
MV/BV of Equity
0.3901 1.3018 1.1549 3.7862
The F-values for various statistics testing the equality 
of mean vectors for two groups are too low to be considered 
significant at the conventional levels of statistical 
significance. Examined at the individual level, however, 
three statements are found to generate statistically
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significant differences between group opinions. Table 4.10 
shows the results for these statements only.
Table 4.10
SUMMARY TABLE OF LOW MV/BV VERSUS HIGH MV/BV GROUPS
Univariate F Tests
Mean Value*
Statement Whole Sample Low MV/BV Group High MV/BV Group P Statistic
4 1.56 1.6966 1.2586 2.63*
10 2.68 2.7862 2.3690 3.71**
13 2.68 2.8828 2.4207 5.89***
(a) Whole sample mean values are taken from Table 4.1, and they are based on 131 respondents' opinions. Number of observations in two groups are 29 as the median value of the MV/BV ratio (1.1549) is used as the cutoff point for grouping.*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Both groups disagree with statement 4 and agree with 
statements 10 and 13. Note that the strength of the opinion, 
measured by the group mean values, for all three statements is 
higher for the low MV/BV group. These results may suggest 
that the managers of low MV/BV firms have a stronger view 
regarding their firms' value being more as parts rather than 
the whole than do the managers of high MV/BV group. The low 
MV/BV group also seems less inclined than the high MV/BV group 
to use an outside consultant and are more willing to go public 
again following the buyout.
4.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusions
The last two decades have witnessed various restructuring 
activities of many American corporations. Among these, most 
companies took the path from public to private. Even before
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a consensus has been reached among academicians on the motives 
for such a move, however, some of these companies returned to 
public trading. This study surveys financial managers of 
publicly traded or private firms that experienced a 
management-led leveraged buyout after 1980 to determine their 
perception of going-private transactions in general, and to 
investigate the undervaluation/information asymmetry motive of 
buyouts in particular.
The analyses that were applied to 131 completed 
questionnaires suggest several conclusions. First, the 
results show that managers do not view the participation of 
the buyout specialist as a major determinant of a buyout's 
success. This finding is at variance with previous empirical 
evidence that buyout specialists are one of the driving forces 
behind improved efficiency following the buyouts.
Second, contrary to previous evidence that buyout targets 
experience a profit decline in the year preceding the buyout, 
the respondents seem to believe that their company was 
performing better than their industry peers before the buyout. 
This suggests that such an opinion is formed mainly by their 
subjective beliefs or private information rather than the 
stock market, or accounting, or other publicly available 
financial measures.
Finally, the majority of financial executives think that 
the target firm as a whole is less valuable than the sum of 
its parts and that its stock is undervalued in the pre-buyout
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period. Although these opinions of executives show
discrepancy among groups formed by principal components and
cluster analysis, the differences stem from the strength of
opinions rather than from divergence of opinions among groups.
More importantly, with the exception of statement 13, no
significant differences are observed between the views of LBO
and reverse LBO groups.
Of course, these conclusions must be evaluated within the
limiting aspects of survey research. Non-response bias, for
example, is a problem common to all survey studies including
the present one. Another drawback is the fact that CFOs are
not the only individuals involved in the buyout decision.
Last, and most important, the possibility that the respondent
might be a totally irrelevant individual exposes this type of
study to criticism. It is very encouraging (with respect to
both the last statement and the information asymmetry
hypothesis), however, that the president of a company (names
withheld for confidentiality reasons) expresses his opinions
in an attached letter as follows:
In general, I believe these (management-led buyouts) occur 
when the stock of the business, or a segment of the business, 
is undervalued and management believes it can accomplish two 
goals: (1) To preserve the integrity and to grow the
business, and, (2) for management to make a large return on their investment of cash or personal risk.
4.5 Notes to Chapter 4
1. Maupin, Bidwell, and Ortegren (1984) find that the stocks 
of going- private firms are traded at relatively large 
discounts from book value (compared to a control sample 
of firms matched on the basis of similar industry and 
asset size) before the buyout. Kieschnick (1989) reports 
a lower stock return for the going-private firms than
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that for a sample of public firms in the year up to the 
quarter before the buyout. Similar inferences are 
attained based on the analysis of various accounting/ 
financial ratios. For example, Wu (1992) documents that 
the average industry-adjusted change in operating income 
(standardized by the market value of the firm in the year 
preceding the buyout) of buyout firms is negative and 
statistically significant in the year before the buyout.
2. One can argue that agreeing with the statement may mean, 
on the managers' side, admitting they are incompetent. 
Magowan's (1989) statement (as well as previous studies 
in the literature) runs counter to this view:
, with KKR'a help, we were able to figure it 
(what n e e d e d  to be done) out for ourselves. . . . There 
were a couple of very specialized tax areas where it was 
necessary to get some extra opinions-we have never been 
through that kind of thing before. KKR was very helpful 
to us in arranging the financing and helping with the 
asset sales, but they basically let the operation of the 
company to us."
(Magowan was CEO of Safeway Stores and a member of the 
management team involved in the buyout.)
3. The role of buyout specialists in efficiency gains is 
generally attributed to both their experience in buyout 
deals and their substantial equity stake in the new firm. 
The latter gives them not only a definite incentive to 
closely monitor managers, but also often the ability to 
fire incapable ones. See Shleifer and Vishny (1988), 
Baker and Wruck (1989), and Denis (1994), for example, 
for the role of buyout specialists in improving the 
efficiency in private organizations.
4. Names, titles, and addresses are identified from various
business information sources of U.S. public and private 
companies: disclosure data, Standard & Poor's Register,
Ward's Business Directory, and Million Dollar Directory.
5. The choice of 0.63 as a cutoff score in the interpreta­
tion is purely arbitrary. It is justified, however, by 
the observation that there is a noticeable distance 
between 0.63 and communalities below it (as opposed to 
those above it).
6. Although not reported, various orthogonal rotation 
methods including quartimax, equamax, and oblimin 
rotations also provide similar results where the same 
statements load significantly on the same factors.
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7. Although recent literature tends to use book-to-market 
value of the equity, market-to-book value of the equity 
is used in this dissertation.
8. Same sample of firms should be used in a follow-up study 
to both objectively evaluate statement 15 and identify 
characteristics of the firms in the three groups generat­
ed by the factor analysis/clustering approach.
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Chapter 5
UNDERVALUATION AS AN INCENTIVE FOR LBOst 
HYPOTHESES TESTS USING MARKET DATA
5.1 Introduction
This chapter tests the information asymmetry hypothesis using 
market data. Based on the comparison of a sample of 21 re-LBO 
firms with a control sample, Chapter 3 concludes that the 
motive for an LBO is not necessarily related to the free cash 
flow hypothesis. The findings presented in Chapter 4 suggest 
that LBOs may be a tool used by management to exploit its 
information advantage. Without additional evidence, however, 
it is difficult, to make a strong statement about the 
information asymmetry hypothesis of buyouts. This chapter 
fills the gap, vis-d-vis a sample of 104 reverse LBO firms.
Chapter 5 compares the value gain realized by these 
reverse LBO firms with that realized by a control sample of 
firms. It also studies the sharing of wealth between pre­
buyout shareholders and managers (who initiate the buyout). 
Although these two points constitute the core of the chapter, 
additional hypotheses are also proposed and tested in order to 
clarify whether management does use buyouts as a tool to 
exploit its information advantage.
The industry hypothesis presented in this chapter studies 
value gains in reverse LBOs across industries to discover 
whether the clustering of LBOs in certain industries has 
anything to do with information asymmetry between managers and
105
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shareholders. The learning-curve hypothesis predicts that 
only successful first-round (public to private to public) 
managers repeat the LBO. The last hypothesis of the chapter 
completes the learning-curve concept (from the point of view 
of the shareholders this time) by comparing the percentage 
premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders in the first and 
second buyouts. The buyout percentage premium must be larger 
in the second buyout than in the first if shareholders are 
fooled (because of their informational disadvantage) in the 
first buyout (and hence require more in the second LBO).
5.2 Reverse LBO Sample Characteristics
From an initial sample of 450 reverse LBO firms, 104 firms are 
selected.1 The buyout values for these 104 firms are the 
completion values of LBO deals as reported in the media (i.e., 
Going Public-The IPO Reporter, Mergers & Acquisitions, 
Mergerstat Review, The Yearbook on Corporate Mergers, Joint 
Ventures and Corporate Policy). The remaining firms are 
eliminated for the following reasons either the buyout value 
is not disclosed to the public, or it is not available in any 
of the sources searched. It is possible to use the market 
value of the firm at its last trading date as a proxy for the 
buyout value. This approach does not provide a great deal of 
help in the present case, however, because the subject reverse 
LBO firms are mainly divisions of other companies and hence do 
not have price or share data available.
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The descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 detail the 
distribution of 104 LBOs undertaken during the period 1980 to 
1993. The first column presents the year of the going-private 
transaction. Column 2 shows the number of LBOs corresponding 
to each year. As shown, 1988 not only has the largest number 
of LBOs (26), but also includes several large LBOs. In fact, 
1988 LBOs account for the largest portion (36%) of total 
buyout value during the 1980-1993 period. Full sample values 
are given in the last row of the table.
Table 5.1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR REVERSE LBO FIRMS, 
GROUPED BY LBO YEAR
Buyout Value (Millions of Dollars)
Year Number of LBOs Mean Median Total
1980 1 195.000 195.000 195.000
1981 4 74.375 107.500 297.500
1982 2 44.100 44.100 88.200
1983 4 93.125 46.250 372.500
1984 10 134.110 76.000 1,341.100
1985 10 158.800 77.500 1,588.000
1986 18 105.544 79.500 1,899.800
1987 5 174.320 131.000 871.600
1988 26 251.659 155.000 6,543.140
1989 10 227.717 265.000 2,277.170
1990 6 168.417 140.000 1,010.500
1991 4 37.900 36.000 151.600
1992 3 504.633 92.500 1,513.900
1993 1 4.100 4.100 4.100
Full
Sample 104 174.56 100.000 18,154.110
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The sample average at the time of the buyout is $174.56 
million, and the median is $100 million. Minimum and maximum 
values are $4.10 million and $1.80 billion, respectively. The 
average period that the sample firms were under private 
ownership is 36.01 months (median is equal to 32.22), which is 
only slightly higher than the 34.2 months (median is equal to 
29) reported by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990). That is, on 
average, LBO firms return to public trading within three years 
of the buyout.
Table 5.2 provides additional characteristics of reverse 
LBO firms, for their reversal (i.e., going public) year. The 
third column gives the average value of the firms (measured as 
the market price at the end of the offer day x the number of 
shares outstanding in the firm) at the time of the public 
offering. Column 4 shows the dollar amount offered in the 
public offering. The last column is the ratio of column 3 to 
column 4; i.e., the percentage of the firm value offered.
The peak year for the reverse LBO was 1987, in which 
there were 21 public offerings of reverse LBO firms. Full 
sample results show that, on average, 32.94% of the firm is 
offered to the public. Although one firm in the sample 
offered 83.14% of its value to the public, a mean 32.94% offer 
value suggests that management, at least in the initial public 
offering, maintains its concentrated ownership in the reverse 
LBO firm.
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Table 5.2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR REVERSE LBO FIRMS, 
GROUPED BY GOING-PUBLIC TEAR
Average Value (Millions of Dollars)
Year Number of Reverse LBOs Firm Value at the Offer Total Amount Offered Offer Ratio (%)
1983 1 103.062 30.000 29.11
1984 2 83.548 29.300 34.79
1985 2 22.211 5.584 25.25
1986 13 147.153 43.420 29.34
1987 21 158.917 46.269 32.58
1988 4 85.082 30.643 34.66
1989 1 150.564 47.850 31.78
1990 1 97.500 46.750 47.95
1991 17 444.645 104.119 30.98
1992 17 291.415 96.913 35.51
1993 18 256.581 70.722 35.47
1994 5 369.757 66.200 28.67
1995 2 217.919 92.080 41.25
FullSample 104 245.859 68.234 32.94
5.3 The Profit Motive in the Reverse LBO (H,)
Under the hypothesis of a semi-strong informationally 
efficient market, it is reasonable to assume that pre-buyout 
shareholders require a premium containing not only the 
potential tax benefits (likely to accrue to the post-buyout 
firm), but also the tax costs associated with capital gains 
through the sale of shares. Under the same reasoning, gains 
created via reduction of agency costs and reduction of 
transaction costs must also be accounted for in the premium.
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Therefore, gains accruing to the buyout investors come from 
the value hidden in the firm (which translates into value 
creation after the buyout).
in the reverse LBO, management, having achieved a 
substantial paper gain in the value of the firm's equity 
because of significantly increased cash flows, sells the 
company back to the public. In addition to reducing the 
financial risk of the firm by lowering the leverage, reversing 
the LBO through the issuance of stock allows buyout investors, 
particularly managers, to reduce their personal risk through 
portfolio diversification. This action, which constitutes the 
first stage of the reversal, is undertaken within a relatively 
short period of the initial buyout.
Hypothesis 3: Management's motivation in an LBO is
to realize a profit by taking the company public 
again.
Given that the free cash flow hypothesis (Hi) is not a 
general explanation to going-private transactions, H3 intends 
to show that the LBO is a tool for management to exploit its 
information privilege. That is, managers buy out the company 
when they think it is undervalued and can thus profit from the 
process.
5.3.1 Implications of H3
H3 is tested by comparing the increased value of the firm 
under private ownership with the possible added value had it 
remained public. H3 is broken down into two sub-hypothesess
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(a) The ignored value hypothesis, which assumes a 
moderate information asymmetry problem and suggests a 
temporary ignorance by the market. A statistically 
insignificant difference between the two measures (value gain 
under private ownership versus value gain in public form) is 
likely to support the ignored value hypothesis, suggesting 
that improvements in buyout firms would have happened anyway 
(with or without a buyout).
(b) The hidden value hypothesis, which implies a severe 
information asymmetry problem. That is, the information 
asymmetry problem is persistent and is not conveyed by another 
means of transmittal to the market.
The hidden value hypothesis is consistent with H2 in that 
the motivation behind the buyout is management's subjective 
belief that the firm's value can be increased significantly. 
Hence, it predicts a lower value for the firm had it remained 
public rather than gone through a reverse LBO process. 
Therefore, a statistically significant increment in the value 
of reverse LBO firms, compared with that of control sample 
firms, supports the buyout investors' superior information, 
which is reflected in investment, production, and 
organizational activities in LBO firms.
5.3.2 A Discussion of the Proxy Variable
The test of H3 requires both a reasonable measure of the 
incremental value of firms (reverse LBOs and control firms) 
and the construction of a meaningful control sample. By their
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nature, reverse LBOs allow one to use a market-based 
performance measure: market value of equity. Figure 5.1




LBO PROPOSAL LBO COMPLETED PUBLIC OFFERING
Figure 5.1 
TIME TABLE OF A REVERSE LBO
The value gain for a reverse LBO firm is calculated as the 
difference between re-entry value and buyout value,
VG = REV - BOV . (1)
Buyout value is the dollar amount reported (in any of the 
sources mentioned on p. 106) at the time of the LBO 
completion (T2). Re-entry value is measured at the time of 
the firm's IPO (T3) as follows:
REV = N x p , (2)
where N is the number of shares outstanding after the public 
offering and P is the stock price at the end of the first 
trading day.
The systematic underpricing of equity IPOs is a well- 
documented empirical phenomenon. Consistent with this, 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) report a 1.70% mean return 
for their full (meaning not divisional) reverse LBO sample at 
the end of the offering day. Although the 1.70% mean return
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is neither statistically nor economically significant (and is 
well below the corresponding number of about 8% for their 
control sample), not accounting for this return in the present 
study may cause downward bias in the estimate of the re-entry 
value.
5.3.3 The Control Sample
As stated above, one way of estimating the change in the value 
of the firm, as if it were a public company, is to contrast it 
to a control sample. Such a sample must contain firms that 
have characteristics similar to the buyout company's. 
Following earlier studies of LBOs, industry category and size 
of the firm are used in this study to construct the control 
sample.
Also consistent with previous studies, industry 
classification is based on a four-digit SIC code. Size is 
proxied by total market value of equity (stock price x number 
of shares outstanding) at the time of the LBO completion of 
the buyout company (T2). Similarly, the calculation of the 
increment in the market value of a firm in the control sample 
is simply the difference between the market values of the 
firm's equities at T3 and T2. A comparison of the LBO sample 
with the control sample should then measure the performance of 
the re-entering LBOs relative to their possible public 
performance.
Table 5.3 compares the mean buyout value of the reverse 
LBO sample with the market value (measured at the time of the
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matching LBO firm's buyout transaction) of the control sample. 
The third column reports the mean difference in the value of 
this variable for each matched pair of reverse LBO firm and 
corresponding control firm. The last column has the 
associated t-statistic for a difference in means test.
Table 5.3
MEAN REVERSE LBO BUYOUT VALUE 
AND MEAN CONTROL FIRM MARKET VALUE
ReverseLBO Firms Control Firms Mean Difference t-statistic*(Million $) (Million $) (Million $) (p-value)
174.558 182.114 -7.556 -0.8224(0.4127)
(a) The F-statistic based on the ratio of variances of the two groups of firms is 1.12. This result indicates that the null hypothesis of equal variances cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signi­ficance and that the use of a t-test is appropriate.
As expected, the mean difference is not significant since 
the market value at the time of the buyout is one of the 
criteria used to create the control sample. Note, however, 
that mean difference is -$7.56 million (an economically 
significant dollar amount), indicating that matching is not 
perfect and that the value of control firms at the time of the 
buyout, on average, are greater than those of the reverse 
LBOs. Although not statistically significant, this finding 
suggests that some adjustment to the VG variable might be 
necessary to remove any potential bias because of differences 
between the values of reverse LBOs and control firms at the 
time of the buyout. The use of return on investment (ROI) is 
intended to take care of this problem and is defined as 
follows:
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ROI = VG / BOV (3)
It is the ROI that will be used in the following hypothesis 
test. If the ROI in the reverse LBO firms is greater than 
the ROI in the control firms, then one can conclude that 
management exploits the gain from undervaluation of the LBO 
firm.
5.3.4 Empirical Test of H,
A difference in means test for matched samples is used to 
test h3. Panel A of Table 5.4 presents the findings of this 
test. As expected, the mean ROI of the reverse LBO sample 
is greater than that of the control sample (the mean of the 
difference is positive, 0.724). The associated t-statistic 
value, however, is 1.015, which suggests that the difference 
is not statistically different from zero. Note that this 
finding is in line with the prediction of the ignored value 
hypothesis (discussed in Section 5.3.1 above), but clearly 
fails to support the hidden value hypothesis. That is, 
improvements in buyout firms would have happened anyway 
(with or without a buyout).
An alternative test of H3 is to compare the difference 
between the pre-LBO firm values and the going-public firm 
values for the reverse LBO firms. Note that this is in fact 
the VG variable defined in section above. The results for 
this variable are given in Panel B of Table 5.4. The mean 
increase in value is $71,300 million and is significant at the 
1% level. Although it is discouraging not to obtain similar
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support from the use of the ROI variable, this last finding 
provides some support for the hypothesis that LBOs are driven 
by the undervaluation of firms. That is, managers do make a 
significant profit by taking a firm private and then bringing 
it public again.
Table 5.4
PERFORMANCE TESTS FOR THE REVERSE LBO FIRMS
Panel A: M e a n  V a l u e s  o f  BOX f o r  Reverse L B O and Control F irms a n d  
C o r r e s p o n d i n g  t - s t a t i s t i c  for D i f f e r e n c e  in M e a n s  Test
Variable Reverse LBO Control Mean Firms Firms Difference t-statisticb (p-value)
ROI* 1.505 0.781 0.724 1.0150(0.3129)
Panel B: M e a n  V a l u e  I n c r e a s e  f o r  R everse L B O  F i r m s  a n d  C o r r e s p o n d i n g  
t - s t a t i s t i c  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e  in M e a n s  Tes t
Second Mean 
Buyout Value IPO Value Difference t-statistic®(p-value)
174.559 245.8590 71.3000 4.3670(0.0001)
(a) ROI is defined as Incremental Value/Initial Value.(b,c) The F-statistic based on the ratio of the variances of the twogroups of firms rejects the null hypothesis of equal variances at a significance level of 1%. However, the use of a t-test is still appropriate for both cases since group sizes are equal (Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams, pg. 345).
5.3.5 An Extension of H3: Industry Hypothesis
An extension of H3 is to examine the value gains across 
industries. This is because LBOs, like repurchases, tend to 
cluster by industry, as reported by Lehn and Poulsen (1988) 
and Kieschnik (1989). In Lehn and Poulsen (1988), the retail, 
textiles, food, apparel, and bottled and canned soft drinks 
industries represent 46.2% of the firms that account for 46.8% 
of the value of 106 leveraged buyouts included in their
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sample. The top four industries in the Kieschnik (1989) 
sample of 102 buyouts are apparel products, food products, 
textile products, and transport equipment. Although 
similarities between the two studies may be due to the overlap 
in the periods covered (Lehn and Poulsen: 1980-1984; and
Kieschnik: 1981-1986), there is an apparent concentration of 
LBOs in certain industries. If the undervaluation hypothesis 
is the explanation for LBOs, then one might generalize 
(coupled with the observed industry clustering) to industry 
and expect to see significantly higher value gains for the 
industry with the highest frequency of buyouts.
5.3.6 Empirical Test of Industry Hypothesis
Table 5.5 presents the number of reverse LBO sample firms by 
industry. Sample firms are distributed in 34 industries 
classified by the first two digits of their SIC code. This 
rather wide industrial distribution of reverse LBOs, however, 
does not prevent some clustering in certain industries. 
Chemicals, food stores, and electric machinery are the top 
three industries in which reverse LBOs are observed most 
frequently. Note that this finding differs from that of 
Kieschnik (1989) (where apparel products, food products, and 
textile products are the leading industries) and that of Lehn 
and Poulsen (1988) (where retail, textiles, and food are the 
three industries with the greatest frequencies of LBOs). 
Although food products or miscellaneous retail industries are 
not among the top three industries in the present sample,
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they, consistent with Lehn and Poulsen's (1988) reporting, 
experience a relatively high number of reverse LBOs (i.e., 
five each).
Table 5.5
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF 104 REVERSE LBO FIRMS
SIC Code Industry Description Number of Firms Buyout Value (Million $)
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 1 150.00
15 Building Construction 2 95.00
20 Food Products 5 513.90
21 Tobacco Products 1 137.00
22 Textile Products 1 105.00
23 Apparel Products 2 111.00
24 Lumber and Wood Products 5 443.20
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1 56.00
27 Paper Products 4 271.70
28 Chemicals 8 1,594.94
30 Rubber & Plastic Products 2 56.30
33 Primary Metals 5 1,412.61
34 Fabricated Metals 5 395.90
35 Nonelectrical Machinery 5 1,406.00
36 Electric Machinery 6 2,293.35
37 Transportation Equipment 3 150.00
38 Measuring and Photo Equipment 3 480.50
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 4 408.00
42 Motor Freight 1 313.00
45 Transportation by Air 1 61.50
50 Durable Goods: Wholesale 3 546.40
51 Nondurable Goods: Wholesale 1 21.00
52 Bldg. Matl, Hardwr, Garden: Retail 1 40.50
53 General Merchandise Stores 1 100.00
54 Food Stores 7 1,225.43
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 1 430.00
57 Home Furniture 6 Equipment Stores 2 727.80
58 Eating and Drinking Places 2 50.63
59 Miscellaneous Retail 5 602.20
62 Securities Brokerage 1 275.00
63 Insurance 5 2810.10
73 Business Services 2 62.00
75 Auto Repair, Services, Parking 1 205.00
80 Health Services 5 438.55
87 Engr., Acct., Resch., Mgmt. Svcs. 2 164.60
Total 104 18,154.11
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In testing the industry hypothesis, the difference 
between the mean value gain of eight firms in the chemicals 
industry and the mean value gain of 12 firms each belonging to 
a separate industry (collective) is compared. The total 
buyout value for the firms in the chemicals industry is $1,595 
million, compared with $1,894 million for firms in the 
collective group. The two groups account for 19.22% of the 
total buyout value of the 104 reverse LBOs.
5.3.7 Results and Discussion
Table 5.6 presents the mean values for these two groups for 
two performance measures: value gain (VG), and return on 
investment (ROI). The difference in means test for the ROI 
variable produces a t-statistic of 3.437, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. That is, the null 
hypothesis that the mean return on investment for the 
collective industry group is equal to that for the chemical 
industry group is rejected. The same conclusion is reached 
for the variable value gain. The associated t-statistic in 
this case is significant at the 5.11% level. These results 
are consistent with the industry hypothesis. That is, firms 
in the highest frequency of reverse LBO groups do obtain both 
a greater dollar value increase and a greater return than 
firms in industries with the least frequency of buyouts. This 
finding, combined with the results of H3, provides further 
support to the undervaluation motive of LBOs.2
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Table 5.6





Value Gain* 237.799 42.815 194.984 1.722’*(Million $) (0.0511)
Return on” 6.948 0.363 6.585 3.437'Investment (0.0014)
(a) Value gain for a firm is the difference between the going-public value and the going-private value.(b) Return on investment is the value gain divided by the going- private value.* and ** indicate 1% and 10% level of significance, respectively, for a one tailed t-test.
5.4 Application of Learning Curve Concept to LBOs
The progression of LBO, second initial public offering (SIPO), 
and re-LBO implies that managers take the firm private when 
they think it is undervalued and bring it back to the market 
when they believe they can attain a higher market value. 
Managers, having experienced the public-to-private/ private- 
to-public cycle, are likely to perform better in the second 
round (i.e., second LBO and its reversal). This proposition 
is consistent with the well-known concept of the learning 
curve.
Regardless of its form, the learning-curve is based on 
the simple logic of "learning-by-doing," as Alchian (1950) 
views it, and refers to the efficiency gained by repeating a 
task (Devinney, 1987). This efficiency, in turn, justifies 
payment of a higher premium to pre-buyout shareholders. Even 
in the absence of a "learning" pattern by management, it is
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likely that the percentage premium required by rational pre­
buyout investors will be larger than the first case, ceteris 
paribus. This statement rests on the assumption that the 
gains of target equity holders are dwarfed by those of 
managers in the first buyout; hence, market participants 
adjust their expectations upward at the second buyout. This 
discussion leads to the formulation of hypotheses 4, 5 and 6.
5.4.1 The Learning Curve Hypothesis (H4)
H4 is an intuitive extension of the Hz and H3. It posits that, 
if the whole process is successful in the sense that the 
returns realized by buyout investors are sufficient to cover 
both the premium paid and their time/effort, then the buyout 
will be exercised a second time.
Hypothesis 4: First-round successful managers
(public to private to public) will repeat public- 
to-private transactions.
H4 is tested using reverse and re-LBO data. The better 
performance of re-LBO firms in the public-to-private/private- 
to-public process, compared with that of reverse LBO firms 
(i.e., firms that stay as public companies after their return 
to the capital markets), will support H4.
5.4.2 Empirical Findings and Discussion of H4
As in H3, the test of this hypothesis is based on the fact 
that both reverse LBO and re-LBO firms possess market-based 
information both on and subsequent to the IPO date. The test 
of H4 compares the value gain of repeating reverse LBO firms
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(i.e., re-LBOs) with that of non-repeating (i.e., those firms 
that stay in the market and do not undertake a second buyout) 
reverse LBO firms that performed better than their matched 
firms in the control firms in terms of value creation. 
According to this design, then, one should find that, to 
support H4, repeating LBOs must have a significantly higher 
mean value for the VG variable than the new sub-sample 
created.
The above sub-sampling process yielded 43 reverse LBO 
firms. The size of the corresponding sample of re-LBOs is 11. 
Ten (out of 21 used in Chapter 3) re-LBO firms are lost 
because of the lack of information about their first buyout. 
In the test that follows this difference in sample sizes is 
taken into account explicitly.
The findings reported in Table 5.7 indicate that 
repeating reverse LBO firms (re-LBOs) do not necessarily 
perform better than the non-repeating reverse LBO firms in 
terms of value creation in their first turnaround (i.e., 
public-to-private/private-to-public). Assuming that the 
performance measure, comparison group, and statistical test 
used are appropriate, H4 cannot be supported. This result may 
suggest that the motive for the second LBO is not necessarily 
a successful first round, but the desire to increase the value 
of the firm toward a perceived value that management thinks 
that it was not achieved in the first attempt.
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Table 5.7
COMPARISON OF VALUE GAINS FOR Re-LBOs AND 
SUCCESSFUL REVERSE LBO FIRMS
Re-LBO Successful M e wVariable Firms Reverse LBOs Difference t-statistic*
Value Gain6 (Million $)
164.910 142.175 22.735 0.263
(a) The F-statistic based on the ratio of the variances of the two groups of firms is 3.33, and hence, the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected at a 1% level of significance. Accordingly, the t-test should be interpreted with caution.(b) Value gain for a firm is the difference between the going-public value and the going-private value.
5.4.3 The Sharing of Health Between Pre- and Post-Buyout 
Shareholders (H5)
Hypothesis 5: Post-buyout equity investors earn
more than pre-buyout (target) shareholders in the
first buyout.
H; is a test of whether the returns realized by buyout 
investors (managers) are significantly higher than premiums 
paid to pre-buyout shareholders. This hypothesis is also 
tested using reverse LBO data. A comparison between the 
percentage premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders and 
management's return should capture this difference. If H5 
cannot be rejected, then it might be concluded that 
shareholders (market participants) are fooled in the first LBO 
because of their information disadvantage (implying that the 
market may not be strong-form efficient).
In order to mitigate the impact of a possible information 
leak on the stock price, the premium paid to target equity 
holders is measured relative to the stock price two months
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before the buyout announcement. The final input needed to 
calculate the percentage premium is the final offer price. 
This is the buyout price defined as the per-share cash payment 
received by pre-buyout shareholders. The premium paid to pre­
buyout shareholders, then, is calculated as the fraction 
difference between the buyout equity price (at T2 in Figure 1) 
and the price of equity two months before the buyout proposal 
(Tl-2ms.):
PP = (PriceT2 - PriceT1.2aaJ + PriceTi_jM.. (4)
5.4.4 Empirical Findings and Discussion of H,
Compared with the test of H4, where there was a serious 
sample size problem, the test of Hs uses 32 reverse LBO 
cases for which market data are available for the period 
prior to their first buyout. This information is particular­
ly important since the premiums paid in these transactions 
cannot be otherwise calculated.
The average private life for this subsample of reverse 
LBO firms is 48.45 months (median=44.76). Note that this 
number is somewhat larger than the full sample value 
(mean=36.01 and median=32.22). Since the remaining cases in 
the full sample are mostly divisional buyouts, this finding 
suggests that divisional management buyouts return to the 
public faster. Perhaps the speed of the public-to- 
private/private-to-public process may be a better indication 
of the information advantage of insiders — a point that may be 
worth studying separately.
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The average time that elapses between the buyout proposal 
announcement and completion of the buyout transaction for 
these firms is eight months (median-five months). This time 
difference suggests that both return measures (management's 
and shareholders') must somehow be adjusted in order to 
provide a meaningful comparison. In Table 5.8, therefore, 
both management's and shareholders' average monthly returns 
are reported. The mean difference between these two matched 
groups is given in column 4. Column 5 presents the associated 
t-statistic (p-value is in parentheses).
Table 5.8
COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT'S RETURN AND SHAREHOLDERS' RETURN
IN REVERSE LBO TRANSACTIONS
Pre-Buyout Mean t-statisticVariable Management Shareholders Difference (p-value)
Monthly Return 0.092046 0.04740 0.045863 0.630(0.533)
As expected, the sign of the mean difference between 
management's and pre-buyout shareholders' returns is positive. 
This difference, however, is not statistically significant. 
This result, combined with the findings for H« and the mixed 
results presented in Section 5.3, casts doubt on the 
information asymmetry hypothesis of LBOs.
5.4.5 Premiums Paid -bo Pre-Buyout Shareholders in the First 
and the Second Buyout (Hs)
Hypothesis 6: In re-LBO transactions, the percent­
age premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders in the 
first buyout is lower than that paid in the second 
buyout.
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A comparison of the percentage premiums paid to pre- 
buyout shareholders in the first and second buyout can be used 
to test the learning pattern by management. This comparison 
may also provide additional evidence on the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. Both learning by management and the 
revised expectations of shareholders (market participants), 
whose returns are dwarfed by managers' in the first cycle, 
justify the payment of a higher percentage premium in the 
second round. This argument (managers gain more than the 
shareholders) is not empirically supported in the previous 
section.
Next, the average prediction errors of the second buyout 
announcement of re-LBO firms are compared with average 
prediction errors of a randomly selected group of LBO firms.3 
Though this process is not a perfect way to test Hs, it is 
worthwhile to examine the comparison of excess returns for the 
two groups of firms.
5.4.6 Empirical Findings and Discussion of He
The conventional market model event study introduced in 
Chapter 3 (pp. 42-43) is used to calculate the average 
prediction errors for two buyout samples. As before, the 
estimation period is -170 to -21 relative to the announcement 
day. Table 5.9 presents the cumulative prediction errors of 
each group and their mean differences for the event window 
[-20,+20] (i.e., days -20 through +20). Both types of buyouts 
provide significant cumulative average prediction errors.
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Traditional t-statistics testing the null hypothesis of zero 
average prediction errors are 7.15 for the re-LBO group and 
4.72 for the randomly selected LBO group. The CAPEs generated 
by second LBO announcements are noticeably higher (a mean 
difference of 19.72%) than the ones created by the first LBO 
announcement. Moreover, this difference is associated with a 
t-statistic value of 14.177, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.
Table 5.9
COMPARISON OF [-20 ,+20] WINDOW CAPES 
FOR FIRST AND SECOND LBO ANNOUNCEMENTS
Second LBO Announcements First LBO Announcements MeanDifference t-statistic
CAPE (%) 37.151 17.431 19.72 14.177*
* Significant at 1% level.
At present, it is difficult to find a reasonable
explanation for such a huge difference between the two types 
of buyouts. However, the significantly higher market reaction 
to the re-LBO announcements may suggest that re-LBOs warrant 
further investigation. This, unfortunately, cannot occur 
until additional re-LBOs take place and a larger sample 
becomes available.
5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examines the information advantage of the 
management team in going-private transactions. Its purpose is 
to test a set of hypotheses (not mutually exclusive) that, one
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way or another, investigate the information asymmetry (or 
undervaluation) explanation of LBOs.
The results obtained from an initial sample of 104 
reverse LBO firms show that the performance (measured by ROI) 
of the reverse LBO firms is greater, on average, than the 
performance of control firms matched by industry and size. 
The lack of statistical significance of the test statistic, 
however, precludes support of the hidden value hypothesis as 
the motivation for buyouts. Perhaps the most noteworthy 
result of the chapter is that there is a statistically 
significant increase in the value of the firm (measured as the 
difference between the firm's value at the second IPO and the 
firm's value at the time of the buyout). A value higher at 
the going-public date than at the buyout certainly offers an 
opportunity for managers to reap the gain for themselves 
rather than sharing it with stockholders. The test of Hs, 
however, contradicts this view. On a time-adjusted basis, the 
mean difference between the ROI of management and of buyout 
shareholders, although positive, is not different than zero.
Contrary to the prediction of H4, in their public- 
private-public cycle, re-LBOs do not necessarily outperform 
the remaining reverse LBO firms that stay as public entities 
after they return to public. This finding may suggest that 
LBOs can also be repeated if managers think that the first 
cycle did not bring the firm to the desired value. Although 
the lack of a strong conclusion about the undervaluation
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explanation for re-LBOs (and LBOs in general) is disap­
pointing, future research should further investigate other 
potential explanations for this observed phenomenon.
5.6 Notes to Chapter 5
1. See Chapter 3, pp. 39-40, for the procedure followed in
constructing the initial sample.
2. This result, of course, might also be due to a technical 
effect. In certain industries there may be a higher 
tendency for buyouts of small firms in order to attain an 
optimal (economic-plant) size. Accordingly, a higher 
frequency and higher value-gain buyouts in an industry 
may not necessarily be related to the undervaluation 
hypothesis.
3. Ideally, this hypothesis must be tested with reLBO data.
However, because the majority of the firms in the reLBO
sample experienced their first buyout as divisions, we 
lack the data necessary to conduct the test.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study examines the phenomenon of re-LBOs; that is, the 
practice of going private via management buyout, then 
reobtaining public status through a new initial public 
offering, and then going private a second time. Using a 
sample of 21 re-LBO firms, the study challenges the free cash 
flow argument of LBOs by replicating the Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) study. If Jensen's free cash flow argument is an 
explanation for going-private transactions in general, it must 
be a major driving force behind re-LBOs as well. That is, 
regardless of a firm's past experience with LBOs, the free 
cash flow argument must also hold for the second LBOs. The 
findings in Chapter 3, however, tell a different story. They 
indicate that, although the free cash flow variable is unable 
to explain both the likelihood of going private and the 
premiums paid in buyout transactions, the tax savings 
potential of a firm does play an important role in the going- 
private decision. The findings also indicate that, contrary 
to the predictions of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis, 
growth in sales is positively and significantly related to the 
premiums paid to pre-buyout shareholders in such transactions.
Chapter 4 proposes the information asymmetry hypothesis 
as an explanation for LBOs in general, and surveys the 
opinions of management teams involved in such transactions. 
The analyses that were applied to 131 completed questionnaires
130
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suggest several conclusions. The results show that managers 
do not consider the participation of a buyout specialist as a 
major determinant of a buyout's success. This finding is in 
contrast to previous empirical evidence that suggests that 
buyout specialists are among one of the driving forces behind 
the improved efficiency following the buyouts. Chapter 4 also 
reveals that the majority of financial executives think that 
the target firm as a whole is less valuable than the sum of 
its parts and that its stock is undervalued in the pre-buyout 
period. Although these opinions of executives show 
discrepancies among groups formed by principal components and 
cluster analysis, the differences stem from the strength of 
their opinions rather than from a divergence of opinions among 
the groups. These conclusions must be evaluated, of course, 
within the limiting aspects of survey research.
The findings presented in Chapter 4 suggest that the 
information advantage of insiders may play a role in LBOs. 
Chapter 5 investigates the issue further, using a sample of 
104 reverse LBO firms in tests of several information 
asymmetry-based hypotheses. Using an initial sample of 104 
reverse LBO firms, the performance (measured by ROI) of the 
reverse LBO firms is not statistically greater than the 
performance of control firms matched by industry and size. 
This finding fails to support the undervaluation hypothesis in 
general. There is, however, a statistically significant 
increase in the value of the firm (measured as the difference
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between the firm's value at the second IPO and the firm's 
value at the time of the buyout) . A value higher at the 
going-public date than at the buyout certainly offers an 
opportunity for managers to reap the gain themselves rather 
than to share it with stockholders. The finding from the test 
of Hg, however, contradicts this view. On a time-adjusted 
basis, the mean difference between the ROI of management and 
of buyout shareholders, although positive, is not different 
from zero. Overall, the findings of Chapter 5 are mixed, and 
generally deviate from the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
This should not prevent researchers from investigating the 
characteristics of reverse and re-LBO firms as new data become 
available. These firms provide certain cases that need to be 
explored. One such incident is the dividend initiation of 
reverse LBOs despite the fact that they are in need of cash, 
at least to cover the service costs of their extensive debt. 
In sum, this dissertation is only a start for the 
investigation of reverse and re-LBO transactions, not an end.
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APPENDIX
Managements' Perception of Buyouts
Instructions: Please mark an X on the line provided beside 
each question. Given the following scale, the length of the 
line segment will be taken as the value corresponding to 
your opinion on each of the statements below.
0. Strongly disagree 4. Strongly agree
Example: The X marked on the line below indicates that the 
respondent "almost" strongly agrees with the statement.
0 1 2  3 4
 1---------- 1---------------- 1---------- 1------ X---1
Begin:
1. A buyout allows management to focus on long- 0 1 2  3 4term growth and profitability................|----1-------1------1----- 1
2. In management buyouts there is a conflict of interest on the part of the managementin that it is acting on both sides of the 0 1 2  3 4transaction as buyer and seller of a company. |----1-------1------1----- 1
3. It is easier for a private firm to sellassets or divisions than it is for a publicly 0 1 2  3 4held company..............................|------ 1------ 1------ 1----- 1
4. It is necessary to rely on outside consul­tants and takeover specialists to determine 0 1 2  3 4the gains of a buyout.....................|------ 1------ I------ 1----- 1
5. In a hostile takeover, incumbent management 0 1 2  3 4of the target firm is replaced............. |------ 1------ 1------ 1----- 1
6. The main motivation for our buyout was ouropinion that pre-buyout market prices of our 0 1 2  3 4stock did not reflect their "true" value. . . |------1----- 1------ 1------1
7. The premium offered is affected by the 0 1 2  3 4recent trend in reported earnings per share . |----- 1------ 1------ 1----- 1
8. Outside shareholders exert pressure in apublicly held company to increase or at least 0 1 2  3 4maintain previous quarters' earnings figures. |----- 1------ J------ 1----- 1
9. Firm performance improves after a buyoutbecause of a closer relation between 0 1 2  3 4management action and rewards............. |------ 1------J------ 1-----1
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10. A buyout is an appropriate strategy in afirm for which the parts are worth more them 0 1 2  3the whole............................... |-- J______ l_______L
11. The premium in a buyout is larger, otherthings being equal, when Incumbent management 0 1 2  3 4also sells off some of its shares............|----1------- 1------1----- 1
12. The main motivation in our buyout was that 0 1 2  3 4the firm was subject to a hostile takeover. . |----1-------1 -1----- 1
13. The equity investors in a buyout usually 0 1 2  3 4go public again in three to five years. . . . |-----1------ 1------ 1----- [
14. The equity investors receive a return ontheir investment commensurate with the risk 0 1 2  3 4they take-------------------------------- |------1------ 1------ 1----- 1
15. Before the buyout my company was performingbetter than comparable firms within the same 0 1 2  3 4industry---------------------------------- |------1------ 1------ 1-----1
16. Premiums paid to shareholders in a buyout are not necessarily indicative of the difference between the market value of thestock and management's belief about the 0 1 2  3 4"true" value of the stock................... |---- 1------ 1------1----- |
17. There is an element of disloyalty in a management-led buyout since it amounts to admitting that management will do a betterjob for themselves than they did for share- 0 1 2  3 4holders................................... I---- 1------ 1------1----- 1
□ Please mark the box to the left with an X if you are interested in receiving the results of this survey.
This concludes the questionnaire. All responses are confidential. 
Please place the completed form in the postage-paid envelope we
have provided.
Thank you for your participation.
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